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Comment
We All Bleed Red: Dismantling the Discriminatory
Gay Blood Ban in the Era of Bostock
Rohan Keith Andresen*

In the mid-1980s, the FDA responded to uncertainty surrounding the
AIDS epidemic with a ban on blood donations from certain groups the
FDA deemed to be high-risk. This ultimately included a lifetime ban on
men who had sex with other men. Although this lifetime ban has been
shortened in recent years, undue restrictions still exist on gay men who
wish to donate blood, despite advancements in medicine and technology
that should render the ban redundant.
As of July 2021, the American Red Cross declared the United States
was suffering a severe blood shortage; nevertheless, the ban remains
unyielding. Yet jurisprudence since 1995—culminating in the 2020
decision in Bostock v. Clayton County—suggests the current ban is
unconstitutional and based solely in animus toward the LGBTQ+
community. This Comment sketches out a path to dismantle the blood
ban, once and for all, on constitutional grounds.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The text “Be A Hero, Give Blood,” emblazoned next to images of the
fallen World Trade Centers, is still used to encourage Americans to
donate blood twenty years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.1 In the days that
followed the deadly attack, Americans all over the country lined up at
local blood banks to come together and donate over a million units of
blood. 2 However, among the patriots being called to the aid of their

1 .
See September 11 Event, INOVA BLOOD DONOR SERVS. (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://www.inovablood.org/event/sept112019/ [https://perma.cc/QU4D-875P] (encouraging
donations to a Virginia blood bank in 2019 in honor of victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks eighteen
years prior); see also Cindy Uken, 9/11 Blood Drive Designed to Honor Fallen Heroes, BILLINGS
GAZETTE (Aug. 25, 2014), https://billingsgazette.com/news/local/9-11-blood-drive-designed-tohonor-fallen-heroes/article_9eab4b18-2d0f-5641-9c49-1b1dbe8dec3e.html
[https://perma.cc/SFY7-FKV5] (urging people, in a Billings, Montana, newspaper advertisement
in 2011, to give blood to honor those lost in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, nearly ten years prior).
2. Gilbert M. Gaul & Mary Pat Flaherty, Red Cross Collected Unneeded Blood, WASH. POST
(Nov. 11, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/11/11/red-cross-
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fellow countrymen, a subset of the population was excluded from
partaking in this selfless act solely because of their sexual orientation,
and they still are today.3
Since 1984, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has effectively
prohibited gay men from donating blood.4 In light of an abundance of
caution triggered by the emergence of the novel human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) that causes acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS),5 the FDA reacted in 1984 by ultimately barring men
who have had sex with other men (MSM).6 Though this was a lifetime
ban until 2015, it was shortened to a one-year period of abstinence in
2015, and then three months of abstinence in 2020 in response to blood
collected-unneeded-blood/639b5ba9-bcb0-40f3-87fb-b0f2c166c614/
[https://perma.cc/5MW2RYW6] (explaining that the Red Cross received so many blood donations that it was forced to
waste many of the donations); Gene Curtis, Donors Overwhelm Blood Banks After 9/11 Attacks,
TULSA WORLD (Feb. 24, 2019), https://tulsaworld.com/archive/donors-overwhelm-blood-banksafter-9-11-attacks/article_d59350a8-ed8c-5a1d-8d39-94dfc1623a7a.html
[https://perma.cc/B4VD-3C7M] (“During the first two days after the attack, 1.5 million units of
blood were donated nationwide . . . .”); Rose Hartman & Zuma Press Inc., Blood Drive at the
American Red Cross in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Twin Tower Bombing in NYC
(photograph), in ALAMY STOCK PHOTOS (Sept. 11, 2001), https://www.alamy.com/sept-11-200131464rh-91101blood-drive-at-the-american-red-cross-in-image64716498.html
[https://perma.cc/K462-BD7Y] (showing crowded waiting room of prospective blood donors
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks).
3. See 21 C.F.R. § 630.10(a–e) (2020) (establishing donor eligibility requirements). Congress
has empowered the FDA—as a federal agency within the Health and Human Services
Department—to create restrictions around blood donations to limit risks. 42 U.S.C.§ 262 (a-c)
(2020); see FDA Organization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fdaorganization [https://perma.cc/TF9B-QMYS] (last modified Jan. 17, 2020) (explaining the role of
the FDA); see REVISED RECS. infra note 6 (recommending the deferral of “[f]or male donors: a
history in the past 3 months of sex with another man . . .”).
4. See id. (establishing donor eligibility requirements); Ronald Bayer, Science, Politics, and the
End of the Lifelong Gay Blood Donor Ban, 93 THE MILBANK QUARTERLY 230, 231–32 (2015)
(explaining the history of the Blood Ban from 1983 to 2014).
5. David Heitz, FDA Moves to End Lifetime Ban on Gay Blood Donors, HEALTHLINE (Jan. 2,
2015),
https://www.healthline.com/health-news/fda-moves-to-end-lifetime-ban-on-gay-blooddonors-122314#One-Year-Deferral-Troubling-to-Lawmakers
[https://perma.cc/RH26-86YF]
(“The FDA established the no donations policy for gay men in 1983 after the government first
learned that HIV could be transmitted via a blood transfusion. It was a time of fear and uncertainty.
HIV tests weren’t very sophisticated.”). See infra note 12 (explaining HIV and AIDS).
6. See 21 C.F.R. § 630.10(a–e) (2020) (establishing donor eligibility requirements); U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REDUCING
THE RISK OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS TRANSMISSION BY BLOOD AND BLOOD
PRODUCTS 3 (2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/92490/download [https://perma.cc/HNG5DQKU] [hereinafter REVISED RECS.]; Adam R. Pulver, NLGLA Michael Greenberg Writing
Competition, Gay Blood Revisionism: A Critical Analysis of Advocacy and the “Gay Blood Ban”,
17 LAW & SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 107, 107
(2008); Maggie L. Shaw, FDA’s Revised Blood Donation Guidance for Gay Men Still Courts
Controversy, AJMC (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.ajmc.com/view/fdas-revised-blood-donationguidance-for-gay-men-still-courts-controversy [https://perma.cc/T43F-73Y4]; see also MSM
Deferral, STANFORD BLOOD CTR., https://stanfordbloodcenter.org/msm-12-month-deferral/
[https://perma.cc/WT2W-8E34] (last visited Aug. 28, 2021) (explaining the Blood Ban generally).
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shortages caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 7 Nevertheless, the
discriminatory restriction exists to this day as both a written policy and
an enforced practice at blood banks.8
Amid substantial progress in the elimination of policies and laws that
discriminated against people based on sexual orientation and in medical
developments in the detection and prevention of HIV transmission, there
has been a renewed call to eradicate this discriminatory policy.
In light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Obergefell v. Hodges and
Bostock v. Clayton County, the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” and
significant medical advancements in the detection and prevention of HIV
transmission, this Comment proposes that any challenge to the gay blood
donation ban will be successful in striking down the discriminatory
restriction.9
II. BACKGROUND
The history of how the policy prohibiting the donation of blood by any
man who has sex with another man was developed is extremely important for understanding why the policy has continued to exist.10 The
policy is as discriminatory as it is anachronistic, but its historical ties to
the emergence of HIV/AIDS and the societal visibility of the gay
community explain the Blood Ban’s enactment, as well as its longevity
and tenacity. The public learned of HIV and AIDS through a stilted media
lens suggesting the virus was inherent in and inseparable from gay men.11

7. See REVISED RECS., supra note 6, at 9 (“Defer for 3 months from the most recent sexual
contact, a man who has had sex with another man during the past 3 months.”).
8. See 21 C.F.R. § 630.10(a–e) (2020); see also REVISED RECS., supra note 6, at 9 (prohibiting
blood donation from a man who has had sex with a man in the previous three months).
9. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24, 635–36 (1996) (holding unconstitutional a state
law prohibiting localities from granting protected class status based on sexual orientation);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578–79 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a state law
prohibiting consensual, same-sex sexual relations in privacy of home); Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (allowing openly gay people to serve in
the United States military); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015) (holding that marriage
is a fundamental right and cannot be denied based on sexual orientation); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,
140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (holding that Title VII’s prohibition of sex-based discrimination
forbids employment discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation); see generally
infra Part II and accompanying discussion of cases.
10. In this Comment, the Author will refer to the MSM ban as the “Blood Ban” and homosexual
as “gay.” The usage of either term is not meant to be pejorative but rather reflects how both terms
are commonly and colloquially used. Furthermore, as this Comment discusses, the Blood Ban only
applies to men who have sex with other men. Thus, “gay” in terms of the Blood Ban is only meant
to refer to men who have sex with other men. This term thus excludes lesbians and includes bisexual
men, for the purposes of this Comment.
11. Christopher McAdam & Logan Parker, An Antiquated Perspective: Lifetime Ban for MSM
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This Part thus recounts the history of both HIV/AIDS and gay rights in
the United States.
A. Introduction of AIDS in the United States
The first known cases of what scientists and medical professionals now
believe to have been HIV/AIDS 12 were documented in a June 1981
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC).13 The report noted what doctors believed
at the time to be a rare case of pneumonia among five young, otherwise
healthy, gay men in Los Angeles in 1980–81.14 By mid-1981, handfuls
of gay men—mostly white and from urban areas—began displaying
similar immunodeficiency symptoms.15 Within months of the publication
of the CDC article, the novel illness began to be referred to by the public
and researchers as “gay cancer” and “GRID” (Gay-Related Immune
Deficiency).16 By the end of 1981, there were 270 reported cases of a
Blood Donations No Longer Global Norm, 16 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 21, 23 (2014) (“‘The
fact that homosexual men constituted the initial population in which AIDS occurred in the United
States led some to surmise that a homosexual lifestyle was specifically related to the disease.’ The
disease was also referred to as ‘gay plague,’ ‘gay cancer,’ ‘gay-related immune disorder,’ and even
a bug that could be brought home to infect the family.” (first quoting The Relationship Between the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES (Mar. 23, 2010), then citing History
of
AIDS
Up
to
1985,
AVERT,
http://www.avert.org/aids-hiv-epidemic.htm
[https://perma.cc/7FR3-8LA9] (last visited Mar. 23, 2013))).
12. Today, we know human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) spreads through contact with
certain bodily fluids and is most commonly contracted during unprotected sex (i.e., sex without a
condom or medicine to prevent or treat HIV), or through sharing injection (intravenous) drug
equipment. HIV attacks cells that help a body fight infection, making people who have HIV more
susceptible to other infectious diseases. If left untreated, HIV can lead to acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). AIDS is the late stage of HIV infection that occurs when the
body’s immune system is very damaged from the HIV infection. Today, most HIV-positive people
in the United States do not develop AIDS because taking HIV medicine daily prevents the disease’s
progression. There is no known cure for HIV, and the body cannot eliminate it on its own; thus, if
contracted, a person will have the virus for life. However, HIV medicine called antiretroviral
therapy (ART) allows people to live “long and healthy lives” and prevents HIV transmission to
sexual partners. Once diagnosed with AIDS, people typically survive about three years unless
infected by a dangerous opportunistic illness, in which case their life expectancy drops to one year.
Nevertheless, ART treatment can still help—and, in some cases, save lives—at this late stage. What
Are HIV and AIDS, HIV.GOV, https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/overview/about-hiv-and-aids/whatare-hiv-and-aids [https://perma.cc/ABC3-K34H] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
13 . A Timeline of HIV and AIDS, HIV.GOV, https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/overview/
history/hiv-and-aids-timeline [https://perma.cc/XSK4-PERG] (last visited Nov. 5, 2020)
(explaining the history of AIDS through an interactive timeline from 1981–2019).
14. See id. (noting 1981 report that five otherwise healthy, gay men died of a rare lung infection,
which doctors believed was pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP)).
15. Id.
16. See id. (noting that the New York Times published an article on July 3, 1981, referring to
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severe immune deficiency among gay men, and 121 of them had already
died.17
In early 1982, the medical community learned that a number of
hemophiliacs, intravenous drug abusers, and Haitians—none of whom
seemed to have any link to the gay community—were suffering from a
similar immune deficiency disorder. 18 Hemophiliac patients require
frequent transfusions of a blood clotting factor received from a national
donor pool.19 This prompted initial theories that the mysterious disorder
could be communicated through the blood.20 However, in summer 1982,
CDC representatives experienced pushback from a variety of
stakeholders21 after presenting the bloodborne-agent causation theory.22
Not many decisions emerged following this meeting; however, the CDC
did recategorize the immunodeficiency as Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS), implying that the illness might affect other
populations besides gay men.23 In fall 1982, more hemophilic patients
began exhibiting AIDS symptoms, including some who had received
transfusions, thus turning the leaders’ attention to blood.24
B. The Development of the Blood Ban
After the medical community’s acknowledgement that AIDS was a

“gay cancer”); Joe Wright, Remembering the Early Days of ‘Gay Cancer’, NPR (May 8, 2006, 4:00
PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5391495 [https://perma.cc/9SGW4BQL] (explaining early stereotypes around the emergence of AIDS and how these misconceptions
of AIDS and the gay community have persisted).
17. See A Timeline of HIV and AIDS, supra note 13 (detailing beginnings of AIDS epidemic in
1981).
18. B. L. Evatt, The Tragic History of AIDS in the Hemophilia Population, 1982–1984, 4 J. OF
THROMBOSIS AND HAEMOSTASIS 2295, 2296 (2006) (describing 1982 emergence of AIDS cases
in populations with no links to the gay community).
19. See id. at 2295 (noting blood transfusion treatments for hemophiliacs); see also Harold M.
Schmeck Jr., Infant Who Received Transfusion Dies of Immune Deficiency Illness, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 1982, at A22 (“Patients who suffer from hemophilia require frequent transfusions of a
blood clotting factor from normal blood to stem their tendency to bleed copiously after the slightest
injury.”).
20. See Evatt, supra note 18, at 2296 (highlighting earliest researchers’ theory of a possible
blood-borne pathogen).
21. Id. at 2296–97. Stakeholders included leaders from the blood industry, gay-rights activists,
representatives from hemophilia groups, and the FDA and the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
Id.
22. Id. at 2296 (“Only the high risk for blood-borne infections could explain a risk common to
all four groups. But, rather than expressing alarm at a possible blood-borne infection and suggesting
ways to reduce a blood-borne risk, the audience expressed an almost universal reluctance to act.”).
23. Id. at 2297 (“The official name of the disease, the AIDS, was established. The new name
facilitated an expansion of investigations beyond that of solely a homosexual problem.”).
24. Id. (“In the fall of 1982, we identified four additional and one probable case of AIDS in
hemophilic patients, two of whom were children. In addition, we investigated and identified AIDS
in a number of individuals who had received transfusions.”).
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bloodborne pathogen, focus began to shift. In early 1982, medical
experts, scientists, blood bank leaders, and gay activists met in Atlanta
and debated the proper response to the growing crisis.25 Blood banks and
gay activists resisted proposals to screen or defer gay men who wanted to
donate blood because gay white men made up a significant percentage of
donors nationwide, and blood banks feared screening questions would
offend.26 However, in March 1983, the Public Health Service published
recommended guidelines to restrict gay men from donating blood.27 The
FDA, CDC, and NIH agreed to the guidelines and enacted exclusionary
recommendations to deter sexually active men who have had sex with
another man from donating blood. 28 The ban underwent multiple
revisions until 1992 when the FDA issued mandatory guidelines
recommending the indefinite deferral of men who have had sex with other
men from donating blood.29
Over two decades later, in 2015, the FDA moved to revise the lifetime
ban on MSM, prohibiting donations only from men who had had sex with
another man in the preceding twelve months.30 The Department of Health

25. See id. at 2296–98 (detailing response to AIDS crisis in 1982). The various parties struggled
to reach consensus because they all had competing self-interests, and the disease was still
mysterious. Evatt recounted his personal experience: “Unfortunately, 4 January 1983 became
possibly the most discouraging and frustrating day of the epidemic for CDC staff. Rather than a
rational discussion of the data, the meeting quickly became a forum to advance individual agendas
and ‘turf protection.’” Id. at 2298.
26. Id. at 2296–97. Gay men were frequent blood donors in large east and west coast cities.
Blood industry leaders feared stigmatizing this population through exclusion without sufficient
evidence of transmission risk. Id. (“The blood industry, threatened by losing a large donor pool,
strongly supported the position of the gay groups on this issue; ‘three hemophilia patients with the
syndrome did not mean that they should spend millions of dollars’ changing recruitment and
screening practices.”); Harvey M. Sapolsky & Stephen L. Boswell, The History of Transfusion
AIDS: Practice and Policy Alternatives, in AIDS: THE MAKING OF A CHRONIC DISEASE 170, 174
(Elizabeth Fee & Daniel M. Fox eds., 1992) (“Sensitive to the concerns of the gay community,
some influential blood bankers were reluctant to force the exclusion of gays and doubted the
effectiveness of direct questioning of donors to achieve that exclusion.”).
27. See Evatt, supra note 18, at 2298 (explaining policies prohibiting blood donations from
“high-risk donor groups,” effectively screening out men who have sex with men).
28. See id. (“[B]ut after appropriate amendments, the FDA, CDC and NIH agreed on a set of
guidelines that was published by the PHS on 4 March 1983, although it was clearly short of what
we, as individuals, at the CDC wanted.”); see Bayer, supra note 4 (“In this context of fear, the US
Public Health Service issued its first, cautiously worded, exclusionary recommendations on March
4, 1983: ‘Sexually active homosexual and bisexual men with multiple partners’ should refrain from
blood donation.”); see also McAdam & Parker, supra note 11 (explaining that the original ban in
1983 followed the issuance of non-mandatory recommendations from the Office of Biologics
recommendation that certain groups, including sexually active gay and bisexual men, refrain from
donating blood).
29. See McAdam & Parker, supra note 11 (giving an overview of the history and evolution of
the Ban); see also Heitz, supra note 5 (noting the 2015 policy change).
30. See id. (explaining FDA’s 2015 modification changing the lifetime restriction to a twelvemonth deferral).
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and Human Services (HHS) made the recommendation based on a
multiagency collaboration within the department, as well as new
information from recent studies and similar reductions abroad.31 Though
this policy change may seem significant after decades of inaction, critics
found the reduction inadequate to eradicating animus.32
Most recently, in 2020, the ban was again reduced from one year to
three months.33 Like the 2015 reduction, this change was inspired by the
success of shortened deferments in other developed countries. 34 Notably,
the United Kingdom and Canada shortened their respective MSM
deferral periods from one year to three months in 2017 and 2019,
respectively. 35 Though advocates celebrated the three nations’

31. Blood Donation Policies Regarding Men Who Have Sex with Men (MSM), Blood Products
Advisory
Committee
Meeting
(March
20–21,
2019),
https://www.fda.gov/
media/120953/download
[https://perma.cc/4D4U-W69M];
Press
Release,
Committee
Recommendation on Change to Blood Donation Ban Continues to Stigmatize Gay & Bisexual Men,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.hrc.org/press-releases/committeerecommendation-on-change-to-blood-donation-ban-continues-to-stigm [https://perma.cc/L9GGAZE6] (last visited Sep 23, 2020).
32. See Press Release, supra note 31 (“‘This recommendation—although nominally better than
the existing policy—falls far short because it continues to stigmatize gay and bisexual men,
preventing them from donating life-saving blood based solely on their sexual orientation,’ said
David Stacy, HRC’s Government Affairs Director. ‘The current policy, adopted in the earliest days
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the new recommendation are both simply wrong and can no longer
be justified in light of scientific research and updated blood screening technology. It’s far past time
for this stigma to end.’”).
33. See REVISED RECS., supra note 6, at 9 (outlining new blood donation guidelines, shortening
deferment to three months for MSM).
34. Patrick Greenfield, Gay Men to Be Allowed to Give Blood Three Months after Sex, THE
GUARDIAN (July 23, 2017, 3:37 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
jul/23/gay-men-blood-donation-three-months-after-sex [https://perma.cc/4TSS-UCF2] (explaining
how blood donation restrictions for gay men and sex workers were relaxed in England and
Scotland); see also May Bulman, Gay Men to Be Allowed to Donate Blood Three Months after
Having Sex under New Government Policy, THE INDEP. (July 23, 2017, 0:11 AM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/gay-men-donate-blood-rules-three-monthsafter-having-sex-12-government-policy-freedomtodonate-stonewall-a7854811.html
[https://perma.cc/GRP5-ZVSU] (explaining that gay men in the United Kingdom would be allowed
to donate blood three months rather than a year after having sex); Blood Donation Waiting Period
for Men Who Have Sex with Men Reduced to Three Months, CANADIAN BLOOD SERVICES (May 8,
2019),
https://www.blood.ca/en/about-us/media/newsroom/blood-donation-waiting-period-formen-who-have-sex-with-men-reduced-to-three-months
[https://perma.cc/KY2F-LUB5] (explaining Canada’s Blood Services’ request to reduce blood
donation waiting period for gay men).
35. See Greenfield, supra note 34 (noting relaxed blood donation restrictions in England and
Scotland); Blood Donation Waiting Period for Men Who Have Sex with Men Reduced to Three
Months, supra note 34 (explaining Canada’s reduced blood donation waiting period); see also
REVISED RECS., supra note 6, at 6 (“The totality of the surveillance information and the experience
with a 3-month deferral in other countries, combined with the uniform use of nucleic acid testing
for HIV, HBV, and HCV, which can detect each of these viruses well within a 3-month period
following initial infection, leads the Agency to conclude that at this time a change to a
recommended 3-month deferral is scientifically supported.”).
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reductions, many doubted such a narrow change could meaningfully
combat the enduring stigma and discrimination.36
Like the Canadian and United Kingdom governments, the United
States also acknowledged the shortage of blood donations during the
COVID-19 pandemic as a compelling reason to increase the size of the
potential donor pool.37 Inarguably, the reduction of the deferral in the last
five years represents substantial progress. However, the mere existence
of any sexual orientation-based deferral—that treats a group as a
monolithic risk, rather than assesses individuals—perpetuates
discriminatory animus. Before analyzing how courts might review a legal
challenge to the Blood Ban as unlawful discrimination based on sexual
orientation, it is imperative to understand the gay-rights movement’s
history and relevant case law.
C. Gay Discrimination, Development of Legal Protections, and
Evolution of AIDS in the United States
The Blood Ban sits indomitably as good law; however, four decades
of gay-rights cases created protections and furthered equality for gay
men, weakening legal arguments for the Blood Ban.
Four Supreme Court cases and the repeal of the federal policy known
as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” set legal precedent and a relevant yardstick
for evaluating facially discriminatory laws and policies. Though not the
only relevant decisions, they show the progression and development of
the Court’s gay-rights jurisprudence. The Supreme Court evolved from
merely allowing gay people to freely go about their daily lives without
state interference (Romer v. Evans; Lawrence v. Texas) to affirming equal
access to significant life activities (Obergefell v. Hodges; Bostock v.

36. See Bulman, supra note 34 (“‘Changes to the blood donation rules are welcome. However,
while this is an important move, it’s vital that this is a stepping stone to a system that doesn’t
automatically exclude most gay and bi men,’ [Ruth Hunt, Chief Executive of Stonewall] said.”);
see also Blood Donation Waiting Period for Men Who Have Sex with Men Reduced to Three
Months, supra note 34 (“‘The work to evolve the blood donation eligibility criteria doesn’t end
here. The research required to generate further evidence-based changes is ongoing,’ added [Dr.
Graham Sher, chief executive officer with Canadian Blood Services].”); see also HRC Staff,
Equality Magazine: FDA Loosens Ban on Blood Donations from Gay and Bi+ Men, HUM. RTS.
CAMPAIGN (June 11, 2020), https://www.hrc.org/news/equality-magazine-fda-loosens-ban-onblood-donations-from-gay-and-bi-men [https://perma.cc/X38S-DQGZ] (“While this FDA
announcement is a step in the right direction, it’s still not enough. We are not yet there with equality
in the rules surrounding blood donations, and won’t be until the policy treats all potential donors
based on the actual risk their blood poses to the blood supply rather than who they are.”).
37 . See REVISED RECS., supra note 6, at 1 (“Furthermore, early implementation of the
recommendations in this guidance may help to address significant blood shortages that are
occurring as a result of a current and ongoing public health emergency.”).
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Clayton County).38
Modern courts employ three levels of scrutiny when they assess
discriminatory policies’ validity: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny,
and strict scrutiny. Rational basis is the lowest level of scrutiny and
requires only that a law be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. 39 Craig v. Boren introduced intermediate scrutiny,
distinguishing classifications by sex—which are not subject to strict
scrutiny—as subject to “rational basis with a bite” or “heightened
scrutiny.” 40 Under intermediate scrutiny, a discriminatory policy must
further an important government interest by substantially related
means.41 Finally, a discriminatory law passes constitutional muster under
strict scrutiny if it furthers a compelling governmental interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.42 Courts apply strict scrutiny to
laws or policies that infringe upon a fundamental right (e.g., marriage) or
involve a suspect classification (race, national origin, religion, or
alienage).43
As HIV/AIDS spread throughout the nation, sectors other than
healthcare and medicine responded. But recognition was slow and came
with animus.44 President Ronald Reagan first publicly recognized AIDS
in 1985—four years after the epidemic began—though, prior to Reagan’s
recognition, Reagan’s press secretary, Larry Speakes, joked about the
“gay plague” and discussed the administration’s lack of concern

38. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003); Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515; Obergefell
v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
39 .
Rational Basis Test, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/rational_basis_test [https://perma.cc/EX2L-S9U9] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
40 .
Intermediate Scrutiny, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/intermediate_scrutiny [https://perma.cc/QFN5-DMN5] (last visited Mar. 16,
2021).
41. Id.; see also Natalie Wexler, Sex Discrimination: The Search for a Standard, in SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: MILESTONES TO EQUALITY 39, 51–52 (Clare Cushman
ed. 2d ed. 2011) (analyzing Craig v. Boren’s application of intermediate scrutiny where the law’s
gender-based distinction must address “important governmental objectives” that are “substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives”).
42 .
Strict Scrutiny, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell
.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny (last visited March 16, 2021).
43. Id.; see also Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (“Under strict scrutiny, the
government has the burden of proving that racial classifications ‘are narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling governmental interests.’” (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Peña, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (1995))).
44. See Philip Shenon, A Move to Evict AIDS Physician Fought by State, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1983 (§ 1), at 31 (detailing the attempt to evict Dr. Joseph Sonnabend, a physician who treated
AIDs patients, by his fellow tenants of the building his clinic was located in).
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regarding the virus.45 But this early indifference soon transformed into
fear and concern. 46 The growing fear in communities prompted
restrictions of gay rights.
1. Romer v. Evans (1995)
In the early 1990s, Colorado voters adopted a state constitutional
amendment that disallowed any judicial, legislative, or executive action
protecting people from discrimination based on their sexual orientation.47
In other words, the voters of Colorado forbade any state or municipal
court, government, or jurisdiction from enacting a law protecting gay
people from discrimination based on their orientation.
The Supreme Court held the amendment unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 48 The Court
explained equal protection is incompatible with arbitrary inequities
imposed by law.49 The Court applied rational basis review, thus declining
to treat homosexuality as a suspect classification. 50 Still, the majority
opinion represents one of the Court’s earliest efforts to counter animus
entrenched in law based on sexual orientation. The Court recognized the

45. See Joseph Bennington-Castro, How AIDS Remained an Unspoken—But Deadly—Epidemic
for Years, HISTORY (June 1, 2020), https://www.history.com/news/aids-epidemic-ronald-reagan
[https://perma.cc/7JFN-LGQ8] (“Yet, U.S. leaders had remained largely silent and unresponsive to
the health emergency. And it wasn’t until September 1985, four years after the crisis began, that
President Ronald Reagan first publicly mentioned AIDS. But by then, AIDS was already a fullblown epidemic.”); see also German Lopez, The Reagan Administration’s Unbelievable Response
to
the
HIV/AIDS
Epidemic,
VOX
(Dec.
1,
2016,
11:20
AM),
https://www.vox.com/2015/12/1/9828348/ronald-reagan-hiv-aids [https://perma.cc/3DYE-VLPU]
(explaining Reagan administration’s slow response to the AIDS crisis); WHEN AIDS WAS FUNNY
(Scott
Calonico
2015),
http://www.scottcalonico.com/when-aids-was-funny
[https://perma.cc/E89H-QMA8] (showing documentary footage of the early response to and
sentiments about AIDS in which many joked about the disease that seemed to only be killing gay
men).
46 . Madonna, among many artists at the time, memorialized the fear and uncertainty
surrounding the AIDS crisis and the young, otherwise healthy gay men who perished during the
crisis. MADONNA, In This Life, on EROTICA (Maverick and Sire Records 1992) (“He was only 23 /
Gone before he had his time / It came without a warning / Didn’t want his friends to see him cry
. . . People pass by and I wonder who’s next / Who determines, who knows best / Is there a lesson
I’m supposed to learn in this case / Ignorance is not bliss . . .”).
47. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (citing statute, whichdisallowed local laws
protecting people based on their “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices
or relationships”); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, invalidated by Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36.
48. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36 (holding the Colorado constitutional provision unconstitutional).
49. Id. at 633 (“Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition
of inequalities.” (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 22, (1948)))).
50. Id. at 632 (“[T]he amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class
it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”); see id. at 635 (“We must
conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to
make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do.”).
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Colorado law’s discriminatory intent and stated, “[L]aws of the kind now
before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”51
When this decision came out, 500,000 cases of AIDS had been
reported in the United States, and then-President Bill Clinton had issued
an executive order establishing an Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS. 52
Though Romer ensured laws could not specifically target homosexuals,
Congress safeguarded the coveted right to marriage as restricted to
heterosexual couples, and within a year of Romer, President Clinton
signed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) into law.53 DOMA defined
marriage as the union of one man and one woman, and it allowed states
to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages granted under the laws of other
states.54 While Romer was a significant first step toward equality, the
prospect was still grim for equal social acceptance and legal rights for
homosexuals while the AIDS crisis persisted.
2. Lawrence v. Texas (2003)
At the turn of the millennium, only a few years after Romer v. Evans,
two men in Texas were arrested and convicted for engaging in consensual
sexual acts, a violation of a Texas statute. 55 Texas law provided: “A
person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse
with another individual of the same sex.”56 Texas law defined “deviate
sexual intercourse” as “any contact between any part of the genitals of
one person and the mouth or anus of another person.” 57 The men

51. Id. at 634 (“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973))).
52. See A Timeline of HIV and AIDS, supra note 13.
53. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), and
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). Passed by Congress and signed into law by President
Bill Clinton, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was intended to protect under federal law only
traditional marriage between a man and a woman. See id. at § 3(a) (defining marriage under federal
law).
54. Id. at § 3(a) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
55. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“The question before the Court is the validity
of a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate
sexual conduct.”); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 127a, 139a, Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (providing original charging documents for alleged criminal conduct
of “deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with member of the same sex (man)”).
56. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE. ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003)).
57. Id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE. ANN. § 21.01(1)(A) (2003)).
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appealed the conviction, claiming the Texas statute was unconstitutional
because, like the law in Romer, it violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.58
The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause protected people’s right to engage in
consensual, private sexual acts. 59 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
explained in her concurrence that “[a] law branding one class of persons
as criminal based solely on the State’s moral disapproval of that class and
the conduct associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause, under any standard of
review.” 60 Lawrence’s holding notably overruled an earlier holding
(Bowers v. Hardwick)—decided in 1986 during the early years of the
AIDS crisis—which had upheld a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy,
finding no constitutional protection to engage in consensual sodomy. 61
In the fifteen years between Bowers and Lawrence, significant
progress had been made inside and outside the courts. Beyond Romer’s
and Lawrence’s holdings that laws cannot simply target people for being
gay, research and public opinion around AIDS had started to evolve, as
well. Around the time Bowers was decided, Princess Diana stunned the
world when she touched an AIDS patient without wearing a glove; 62
conversely, by the time Lawrence was decided, a rapid HIV diagnostic
kit with a 99.6 percent accuracy rate had been developed,63 and President
George W. Bush allocated $15 billion to combat AIDS in countries with
a high burden of infections.64 Significant progress was being made for

58. Id. (“They challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution.”).
59. Id. at 562, 578–79.
60. Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
61. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (“The law, however, is constantly based on
notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. . . . [The respondent] insists that
majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We do not
agree . . . .”), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578
(“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain
binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”).
62 .
How Princess Diana Changed Attitudes to AIDS, BBC (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-39490507 [https://perma.cc/FZ4W-KMDW] (“In front
of the world’s media, Princess Diana shook the hand of a man suffering with the illness. She did so
without gloves, publicly challenging the notion that HIV/Aids was passed from person to person
by touch. She showed in a single gesture that this was a condition needing compassion and
understanding, not fear and ignorance.”).
63. A Timeline of HIV and AIDS, supra note 13.
64. Fact Sheet: The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES
(Jan. 29, 2003), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/200301291.html [https://perma.cc/FK6K-KW6T].

246

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 53

gay rights in the courts as well as in the battle against AIDS, but the Blood
Ban remained untouched.
3. Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)
Federal gay rights remained essentially stagnant for the next decade.
But the Supreme Court delivered two consecutive wins for gay rights,
first in United States v. Windsor (2013), and more significantly in
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015).65 Windsor asked whether gay partnerships
could qualify for tax benefits heterosexual couples enjoyed; however, it
effectively eliminated DOMA’s definition of marriage for federal
purposes as exclusively between a man and a woman.66 Consequently,
Windsor paved the way for Obergefell.67 Furthermore, as noted earlier,
Obergefell marked a difference from the Court’s treatment of gay rights
in Romer and Lawrence. In the few years between Windsor and
Obergefell, the Court’s analysis evolved from asking, “Does the
Constitution protect homosexuals from discriminatory laws?” to “Does
the Constitution afford homosexuals equal rights?” The Obergefell Court
said yes.
The Court in Obergefell ultimately held that same-sex couples have
the same fundamental right to marry afforded to all under the Fourteenth
Amendment.68 The Court reached this conclusion through both a dueprocess analysis of the fundamental right to marry, as well as an equalprotection analysis. 69 The Court also stressed the many benefits of
marriage and the risks of denying gay couples access to benefits afforded

65. See Sarah Wheeler, United States v. Windsor, Obergefell v. Hodges and the Future of LGBT
Rights in the Workplace, 33 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 329, 332 (2016) (“The outcome of Windsor
was a pivotal moment in the fight to legalize same-sex marriage in the United States.”); see id. at
334 (“Just four years after the Windsor decision, the Obergefell decision made it illegal for
individual states to refuse to recognize the same-sex marriages of couples based on where their
ceremony was.”); see generally United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); see generally
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
66 . Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775 ("The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose
overcomes the pur- pose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage
laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”); see Wheeler, supra note 65, at 330–31
(providing background on Windsor holding).
67. Id. at 335 (“The overturn of section 3 of DOMA had broad implications not just for marriage
equality up until the decision in Obergefell issued . . . .”).
68. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 672 (“The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the
liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee
of the equal protection of the laws.”).
69. Id. at 664 (“[T]he Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. In
Loving v. Virginia, . . . which invalidated bans on interracial unions, a unanimous Court held
marriage is ‘one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.’” (quoting 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967))); see id. at 681 (“The Court, in this decision, holds samesex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States.”).
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to other married couples. 70 The Court emphasized that the right to
marriage was essential to the fundamental right to build a family. 71
Accordingly, much of the opinion stemmed from the importance of
allowing all to exercise this fundamental right, rather than an analysis of
equality for gay people. 72 Although the Court acknowledged that the
Equal Protection Clause was implicated in this case, the Court refrained
from deciding if classifications based on sexual orientation required any
form heightened scrutiny and instead rested upon due-process analysis of
the fundamental right to marriage along with the implication of the Equal
Protection Clause.73
Obergefell was pivotal for allowing homosexuals to enjoy the
fundamental right of marriage, and it paved the way for the second phase
of gay-rights cases in the Supreme Court, that affirmatively granted equal
rights. Nevertheless, the Court’s limitation on extending a higher level of
scrutiny based on sexual orientation is significant.
Meanwhile, from the Lawrence v. Texas decision in 2003 to the time
the Supreme Court heard Obergefell, annual HIV diagnoses in the United

70. See Mark P. Strasser, Obergefell’s Legacy, 24 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 61, 69–72
(2016) (discussing legal benefits and risks afforded married versus unmarried couples).
71. See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 668 (“As all parties agree, many same-sex couples provide
loving and nurturing homes to their children . . . . Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus
conflicts with a central premise of the right to marry.”). Including the right to build a family, the
Court recognized four principles of why marriage is a fundamental right under the Due Process
clause, these included 1) the personal choice of choosing whom to marry as inherent to one’s
individual autonomy 2) marriage’s unique support and recognition of a two-person union 3) the
safeguarding of children in a family unit 4) the importance of marriage in the nation’s social order.
Id. at 665-72; see also Rodney M. Perry, Obergefell v. Hodges: Same-Sex Marriage Legalized,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Aug. 7, 2015), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44143.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XE3P-U6YK].
72. See id. at 663–73 (analyzing right to marry as a fundamental right under due-process
analysis).
73. See id. at 675 (“These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of
that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental
right to marry.”); Ann L. Schiavone, Unleashing the Fourteenth Amendment, 2016 WIS. L. REV.
FORWARD 27, 28 (“[C]ases like Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell potentially signal a
shift away from declaration of new rights and suspect classes, while applying a stronger rational
basis test.”); see also Strasser, supra note 70, at 88 (“The Obergefell Court suggested that equal
protection informed its decision, while at the same time not recognizing sexual orientation as a
protected class. Perhaps in light of Romer, Lawrence, Windsor and Obergefell the Court will soon
announce that orientation is suspect or quasi-suspect. Perhaps not.”); Perry, supra note 71 at 5
(“The Court held that both equal protection and due process guarantees protect the fundamental
right to marry, and that states can no longer deny this right to same-sex couples. Importantly, in
doing so, the Court did not hold that classifications based on sexual orientation warrant any form
of heightened scrutiny.”).
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States had fallen by approximately 20 percent.74 Additionally, between
Lawrence and Obergefell, the FDA had approved the use of a medication
called Truvada, a pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP), that reduced the risk
of communicating the virus through sexual activity.75 Furthermore, at the
time of Obergefell, the World Health Organization announced new
treatment recommendations that called for all people living with HIV to
begin antiretroviral therapy after diagnosis. 76 The World Health
Organization also determined that taking PrEP as an additional
prevention measure for those at substantial risk for contracting HIV could
help avert more than 21 million deaths and 28 million new infections by
2030.77 Finally, the same year Obergefell was decided, the FDA Blood
Ban on gay donors was modified from an indefinite restriction to a
twelve-month deferral.78
4. Bostock v. Clayton County (2020)
Most recently, the Supreme Court decided Bostock v. Clayton County
in early 2020.79 Bostock was consolidated with two other similar cases:
Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda and R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 80 The Supreme
Court heard these three cases together because their factual similarities
posed the same legal question.81 Each questioned whether terminating an
employee based on their sexual orientation or transgender status violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), which forbids sexbased discrimination.82 In all three cases, an employer terminated a longtime employee shortly after the employee had divulged that he or she was
transgender or gay.83
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) specifically
prohibits the termination of employees based on an individual’s race,

74. See A Timeline of HIV and AIDS, supra note 13 (showing the decline in new HIV diagnoses
during the time between Lawrence and Obergefell).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
80. Id. at 1731.
81. Id. at 1737.
82. See id. (“[I]n Title VII, Congress outlawed discrimination in the workplace on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Today, we must decide whether an employer can fire
someone simply for being homosexual or transgender.”).
83. Id. (“Each of the three cases before us started the same way: An employer fired a long-time
employee shortly after the employee revealed that he or she is homosexual or transgender—and
allegedly for no reason other than the employee’s homosexuality or gender identity.”).

2021]

We All Bleed Red

249

color, religion, sex, or national origin. 84 Title VII had been amended
multiple times prior to the Bostock ruling.85 “So long as the plaintiff’s sex
was one but-for cause of that decision [to fire], that is enough to trigger
the law.”86 Courts had long assumed that Title VII did not protect against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.87 But the Supreme Court in
Bostock interpreted Title VII’s text to cover discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity as sex-based.
The Court interpreted Title VII to mean that “an employer who
intentionally treats a person worse because of sex—such as by firing the
person for actions or attributes it would tolerate in an individual of
another sex—discriminates against that person in violation of Title
VII.” 88 The Court found sexual orientation and gender identity are
inextricably tied to sex and, therefore, both included in the protection
from discrimination based on “sex” under Title VII.89 The Court went on
to explain that “[f]or an employer to discriminate against employees for
being homosexual or transgender, the employer must intentionally
discriminate against individual men and women in part because of sex.”90
The Court emphasized this was not a new interpretation of Title VII but
rather an application of an already-prohibited employer action.91
Bostock involves statutory—not constitutional—interpretation. Unlike
the preceding cases, Bostock may be viewed in more of a vacuum, in
which the Court’s interpretation goes no further than Title VII’s explicitly

84. (a) Employer practices: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2019).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2019); see Max C. Farris, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 543, 544 (2007) (providing an overview of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and its amendments).
86. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739; see generally Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 211
(2014); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350 (2013).
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2019) (enumerating protected classes of employees); see also Allen
v. Min. Fiber Specialists, No. Civ. A. 02-7213, 2004 WL 231293, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2004)
(finding Title VII does not address discrimination based on sexual orientation); Farris, supra note
85, at 580 (“Title VII does not recognize sexual orientation as a classification and discrimination
based on sexual orientation is not actionable under Title VII.”).
88. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740.
89. Id. at 1742. The Court further elaborated that the connection to sex exists, “[n]ot because
homosexuality or transgender status are related to sex in some vague sense or because
discrimination on these bases has some disparate impact on one sex or another, but because to
discriminate on these grounds requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees
differently because of their sex.” Id.
90. Id. at 1743.
91. See id. (describing the decision as a “straightforward application of legal terms” to an issue
that “has always been prohibited” under Title VII).
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stated protections. 92 Therefore, some may argue that Bostock’s
explanation that sexual orientation and identity are inextricably linked to
sex need not extend beyond Title VII. The majority in Bostock—like in
Romer, Lawrence, and Obergefell—declined to hold that sexual
orientation classifications should be assessed under any higher standard
of review than rational basis.
The Court in Romer clearly applied a rational basis review, while the
Court in Lawrence and Obergefell focused its discussions on the denial
of a fundamental right (privacy and marriage); in Bostock, the Court
avoided this discussion altogether by simply answering the statutory
interpretation question before it. 93 But as much as Bostock operates
within a statutory vacuum, its reasoning could apply just as easily to
future questions regarding discrimination based on sexual orientation that
would trigger an Equal Protection Clause analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment.94 Justice Alito also referenced this possibility in his dissent
in Bostock, where he stated:
Finally, despite the important differences between the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VII, the Court’s decision may exert a
gravitational pull in constitutional cases. Under our precedents, the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits sex-based discrimination unless a
“heightened” standard of review is met. By equating discrimination
because of sexual orientation or gender identity with discrimination
because of sex, the Court’s decision will be cited as a ground for

92. See Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 974 (D. Idaho 2020) (“Further, although in the
context of Title VII, the Supreme Court has, as mentioned, recently stated, ‘it is impossible to
discriminate against a person for being . . . transgender without discriminating against that
individual based on sex.’” (quoting Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741)). Because the Court’s decision in
Bostock revolved around the interpretation of a specific statute, the holding does not necessarily
have to define “gender” or “sex” for other statutes as the same way it was defined in Bostock.
Nevertheless, the court in Hecox uses the decision in Bostock as persuasive in its decision regarding
transgender rights.
93. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003); Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515; Obergefell
v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
94. See Sharita Gruberg, Beyond Bostock: The Future of LGBTQ Civil Rights, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Aug. 26, 2020, 9:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbtqrights/reports/2020/08/26/489772/beyond-bostock-future-lgbtq-civil-rights/
[https://perma.cc/AWJ9-ANEM] (“Despite the holding’s language and Bostock’s focus on firing
under Title VII, the potential impact of the decision is much broader: The Supreme Court’s opinion
states that ‘it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender
without discriminating against that individual based on sex.’” (citing Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741));
see id. (“An extension of the Supreme Court’s finding in Bostock that sex necessarily includes
sexual orientation and gender identity could also mean, then, that laws that target people based on
sexual orientation or gender identity could be subject to heightened scrutiny.”); see generally Hecox
v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930 (D. Idaho 2020).
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subjecting all three forms of discrimination to the same exacting
standard of review.95

Justice Alito recognized that, though Bostock ostensibly restricted its
holding to the statutory interpretation of Title VII, the majority’s
reasoning lends itself to deeper inferences and broader applications. 96
Nevertheless, Bostock extended newly recognized rights and protections
to homosexuals, and it was an important step in gay-rights legislation and
jurisprudence.
As gay rights have continued to evolve, HIV/AIDS statistics have also
improved in the years between Obergefell in 2015 and Bostock in 2020.
Between 2015 and 2019, new diagnoses decreased by 9 percent. 97 In
2019, male-to-male sexual contact amounted for 65 percent of new cases,
while the remainder was attributed to heterosexual contact or injection
drug use.98 Contemporaneously, there has also been a 73 percent annual
increase between 2012 and 2016 (an 880 percent total increase) in the
number of PrEP users, with over 77,000 people using PrEP in 2016.99
Furthermore, recall that in early 2020, the one-year ban on MSM donors
was further reduced to a three-month deferral,100 while President Donald
Trump outlined a plan aimed to end the HIV epidemic (by 2030) and
secured donations from the drug manufacturer Gilead to donate PrEP
medication for up to 200,000 individuals for up to eleven years.101
5. Repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell
Alongside the aforementioned Supreme Court cases, the government
took additional action to reverse discriminatory laws and policies.

95. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In Justice Alito’s
dissent, he focuses on the consequences that the majority opinion’s definition of sex to include
sexual orientation and transgender status could have beyond simply a Title VII statutory reading.
Justice Alito foresees the possibility for this definition to influence constitutional and equal-rights
analyses, triggering a heightened level of scrutiny that was not afforded to sexual orientation or
transgender status prior to Bostock.
96. Id.
97. See HIV: Basic Statistics, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/statistics.html [https://
perma.cc/M5JW-RQDK] (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (outlining basic statistics, changes, and trends
for HIV tracking in the United States).
98. Id.
99. Mapping PrEP: First Ever Data on PrEP Users Across the U.S., AIDSVU (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://aidsvu.org/prep/ [https://perma.cc/N7YS-78RU] (looking at the number of PrEP users
throughout the U.S. and over different periods of time).
100. See REVISED RECS., supra note 6, at 9 (outlining the purpose and the current status of the
FDA MSM policy).
101. Trump Administration Secures Historic Donation of Billions of Dollars in HIV Prevention
Drugs, HIV.GOV (May 9, 2019), https://www.hiv.gov/blog/news-release-trump-administrationsecures-historic-donation-billions-dollars-hiv-prevention [https://perma.cc/9NDS-Y828]; What Is
Ending the HIV Epidemic in the U.S.?, HIV.GOV, https://www.hiv.gov/federal-response/endingthe-hiv-epidemic/overview [https://perma.cc/5V2X-S5DM] (last updated June 2, 2021).
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Perhaps the most recognizable anti-gay policy was “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell,” which President Clinton signed into law in 1993.102 “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” (DADT) was one of the few federal policies—including the
Blood Ban—that specifically burdened individuals based on their sexual
orientation.103 DADT barred openly gay, bisexual, and lesbian people
from serving in the military based on the assumption that they would
disturb the morale, order, discipline, and cohesion of the military.104 The
policy was enforced throughout its time as law; during the approximately
fifteen years it existed, DADT was used to discharge more than 13,000
gay, lesbian, and bisexual soldiers from the American military.105
In 2010, President Barack Obama certified the repeal of DADT, stating
that the policy was discriminatory and that all Americans—no matter
their sexual orientation—should be free to serve in the United States
military.106
DADT’s relevance to the Blood Ban is twofold. First, after DADT’s
repeal, the Blood Ban remains the most prominent facially discriminatory
federal policy grounded in gay animus. 107 Second, both restrictions
barred gay Americans’ access to activities to which Americans are
frequently called as a way to selflessly give back to their country. The
repeal of DADT reversed a facially discriminatory policy, marking an
important milestone in the gay-rights movement.

102. Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces (“Don't Ask Don't Tell Act”), Pub.
L. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1670–73 (1993), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. The regulation prohibited military applicants from
disclosing their sexual orientation, and military personnel could be discharged based on their stated
sexual orientation.
103. Pulver, supra note 6, at 108.
104. Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Act § 571(a), supra note 102, (“The presence in the armed forces of
persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an
unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that
are the essence of military capability.”).
105. Sarah Pruitt, Once Banned, Then Silenced: How Clinton’s ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy
Affected LGBT Military, HIST. (July 3, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/dont-ask-dont-tellrepeal-compromise [https://perma.cc/C4U8-XFM8] (citing Servicemembers Legal Defense
Network).
106. See Press Release, Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Repeal of Don’t Ask,
Don’t
Tell
(Sept.
20,
2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/09/20/statement-president-repeal-dont-ask-dont-tell [https://perma.cc/5ZZW-3AYW]
(“[T]he discriminatory law known as ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ is finally and formally repealed. As
of today, patriotic Americans in uniform will no longer have to lie about who they are in order to
serve the country they love.”); see generally Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.
107. See Pulver, supra note 6, at 108 n.2 (explaining that besides the gay Blood Ban, ‘Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell’ was the only other notable federal policy that “specifically care[d] about the
gender of one’s sexual partner”).
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III. DISCUSSION
Though the Blood Ban has endured nearly forty years, it has not
existed without criticism and pushback. 108 Many gay community
activists vehemently opposed the Blood Ban in the early days of the AIDS
crisis.109 But attention quickly shifted elsewhere as the epidemic spread,
and the Blood Ban was forgotten.110 The next group to criticize the Ban
were mostly college students in the mid-2000s. 111 Thus, some of the
policy’s early critics did not live through the height of the epidemic; they
did not carry the troubling memories of what the crisis was like when it
seemed uncontrollable. This Comment categorizes the college-based
movements in the mid-2000s as the “first wave” of Blood Ban criticism.
Condemnation has also come from other sources in recent years. Over
the past five years or so, lawmakers started to take notice of the Blood
Ban, even including it in some of their positions, speeches, and proposed
laws.112 This Comment will consider pushback by lawmakers and elected
officials as the “second wave” of criticism. Interestingly, however, the
Ban does not seem to be a major point of contention among LGBTQ+
advocacy groups, with not even a mention on the Human Rights
Campaign’s website among the federal legislation that it opposes and
supports. 113 Similarly, the website of the Gay & Lesbian Alliance
Against Defamation (GLAAD) contains no mention of it on their

108. Ben Carlson, Letter to the Editor, Drop the Foolish Ban on Blood Donations by Healthy
Gay Men, S.F EXAM’R, Jan. 26, 1994, at 18.
109. See Pulver, supra note 6, at 113 (“Gay groups continued to oppose screening vehemently,
decrying it as ‘“scapegoating” homosexuals,’ ‘reminiscent of miscegenation blood laws that
divided black blood from white,’ and similar to the ‘rounding up of Japanese-Americans . . . to
minimize the possibility of espionage’ in World War II.” (citing RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND
PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 199 (1987))).
110. See id. at 117 (“The issue of gays and donor deferral was replaced with concerns about the
impact of widespread testing, including dealing with the potential diagnosis of thousands of gay
men en masse.”); see also SHILTS supra note 109, at 539–43 (noting that the health crisis became
the priority for gay men and activists).
111. See Pulver, supra note 6, at 119 (“Most prominently, these arguments have been made by
student groups on college campuses across the country, mostly LGBT student clubs or student
government associations that sponsor blood drives.”).
112. See generally Susan Scutti, Lawmakers Urge FDA to Lift Blood Ban for Gay Men, CNN
(June 28, 2016, 5:32 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/28/health/fda-gay-men-blooddonation/index.html [https://perma.cc/CE3A-XF3W]; Jill Cowan, Why a California Lawmaker is
Pushing to Change Plasma Donation Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/coronavirus-blood-plasma-donation.html
[https://perma.cc/64RV-22C2].
113 .
See generally Federal Legislation, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org
/resources/federal-legislation [https://perma.cc/DNN7-YLLM] (last visited Sept. 25, 2020)
(omitting any mention of the gay Blood Ban or any reference to current legislation aimed at
eradicating it).
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“Legislation” page. 114 Nevertheless, individual advocates demand the
gay Blood Ban’s elimination.115
The first wave’s history shows why, despite twenty years of public
outcry, the policy still stands. The second wave, as this Comment
proposes, is more likely to succeed long-term, though it, too, has its
faults. This section will explore the two waves of criticism, their merits,
and their shortcomings.
A. First Wave of Advocacy—College Students
The first wave of advocacy to address the gay Blood Ban in the United
States came, unsurprisingly, from the nation’s college campuses. 116
Statistically, students in the mid-2000s would have been the first
generation of adults in the United States who were too young to
experience firsthand the first two decades of the AIDS epidemic and,
consequently, the fear and uncertainty that surrounded the virus.117 By
the time the early college protests began to gain momentum in 2006,
twenty-five years had passed since gay men had started dying from a
mysterious sickness in Los Angeles.118
Even more noteworthy, when the college movements began, the
epicenter of AIDS had shifted from the United States and the developed

114. See Legislation, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/tags/legislation [https://perma.cc/34UJLGHF] (last visited Oct. 2, 2021). A mention of the Blood Ban is found only when one digs deeper
to a “media reference guide” page, which contains outdated information. See GLAAD Media
Reference Guide - In Focus: HIV, AIDS, & the LGBTQ Community, GLAAD,
https://www.glaad.org/reference/hiv [https://perma.cc/2RBY-D5KJ] (last visited Sept. 25, 2020)
(“[G]ay and bisexual men are still prohibited by federal law from donating blood unless they have
been celibate for at least one year. In December 2015, the FDA amended its policy that previously
banned all gay and bisexual men from donating blood.”).
115. See, e.g., Michael Christian Belli, The Constitutionality of the “Men Who Have Sex with
Men” Blood Donor Exclusion Policy, 4 J. L. SOC’Y 315, 373–74 (2003) (explaining that the blood
ban policy does not meet rational basis scrutiny, even before Bostock and Obergefell); see also,
Pulver, supra note 6, at 129 (explaining that while the Blood Ban ideally should not exist, there
may be other more important priorities for the gay-rights agenda); Sam Hemingway, UVM Blood
Drives to Continue, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Jan. 30, 2006, at 7 (discussing discrimination
complaints brought relating to blood drives at the University of Vermont); John G. Culhane, Bad
Science, Worse Policy: The Exclusion of Gay Males from Donor Pools, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 129, 131 (2005) (“This perception is detrimental to gay men in two related ways: First, it
erodes self-esteem and contributes to a climate in which other kinds of discrimination are more
easily justified. Second, the policy is so plainly absurd that it risks being ignored by gay men who
should self-defer.”).
116. See Pulver, supra note 6, at 119 (“Most prominently, these arguments have been made by
student groups on college campuses across the country . . . .”).
117. See id. at 121 (“Many gay college students in the twenty-first century have also never met
anyone with HIV, and certainly do not consider themselves high-risk . . . .”).
118. See A Timeline of HIV and AIDS, supra note 13 (explaining that in 1981, an article was
released in which doctors believed that five otherwise healthy gay men died of a rare lung infection,
pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP)).
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world. 119 The virus was now predominantly in Sub-Saharan Africa,
which, by the end of 2005, accounted for 64 percent of new infections
globally.120 For instance, in 2005, fewer than 14,000 people died from
HIV/AIDS in the United States, whereas nearly 109,000 people died from
the disease in Kenya. 121 Therefore, college students likely associated
AIDS with the developing world and not with gay men in the United
States, as the prior generation had.122 This lack of a cognitive bias may
have allowed college students to consider the gay Blood Ban more
rationally. Furthermore, college students tend to be more liberal-leaning
and more likely to protest—so the first whispers of dissonance
understandably came from the halls of the nation’s colleges.123
The issue also enjoyed heightened visibility on college campuses.
LGBT campus organizations, coupled with the prevalence of blood drives
at colleges, created an environment where discrimination was on display
for a progressive and politically vocal population. Advocacy and protests
ensued.
In 2006, more than twenty college campuses participated in the “Fight
to Give Life” campaign.124 During this movement, LGBT student groups
119. WORLD HEALTH ORG., AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE: SPECIAL REPORT ON HIV PREVENTION
20 (2005) http://www.who.int/hiv/epi-update2005_en.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/5KA4-FFBU]
(explaining the updates of the AIDS epidemic globally).
120 .
See AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2005, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/hiv/pub/epidemiology/epiupdate2005/en/
[https://perma.cc/4E7K-93V7]
(last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (“[S]ub-Saharan Africa continues to be the most affected globally– with
64% of new infections occurring here (over three million people).”).
121 .
Max Roser & Hannah Ritchie, HIV/AIDS, OUR WORLD IN DATA,
https://ourworldindata.org/hiv-aids [https://perma.cc/H4YR-ZBY2] (last visited Aug. 29, 2021);
see also UNAIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE: DECEMBER 2006, at 3
(2006) http://data.unaids.org/pub/epireport/2006/2006_epiupdate_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6V39ADEW] (noting that cases in Sub-Saharan Africa continued to increase, especially among women).
122 . See Roser & Ritchie, supra note 121 (noting that, in an analysis of the statistics,
numerically AIDS was affecting far more people in Africa and the developing world rather than in
the United States and Europe); see also Pulver, supra note 6, at 121.
123. New Research on College Students Political Views, Association of American Colleges and
Universities
(2008),
https://www.aacu.org/publications-research/periodicals/new-researchcollege-students-political-views [https://perma.cc/7PG5-Y253] (A compilation of 2008 Survey of
America’s College Student to illustrate the political beliefs and views of college students, at that
time); see also Christopher J. Broadhurst, Campus Activism in the 21st Century: A Historical
Framing, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, 3-4 (Sept. 2014) (“The campus protests of
each period, while unique, often represent a continuation from earlier eras. Activists are often
unaware of such connections, but strong protest tradition in American higher education exists in
the very causes students fight for and the tactics used to achieve their goals.”).
124. Pulver, supra note 6, at 119–20. As a Northeastern University student newspaper article
explained, “Fight to Give Life is a national organization opposed to the current regulations
regarding blood donations from homosexual men. Fight to Give Life was founded November by
Shawn Werner, current president of the organization, and comprises college students from around
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accompanied gay male students to blood donation centers where they
attempted to donate blood, showing their desire to contribute and give
back to the community. 125 The following year, a handful of Harvard
students created a website complaining of the ban and urging Americans
and lawmakers to reconsider what they deemed a nonsensical blooddonation policy in the United States.126 The now-defunct website, which
was active throughout the 2000s, pointed out that the Blood Ban was born
of homophobia and had an undeniable discriminatory effect.127
Regardless of the good intentions and fervor of the student-led
advocacy groups and protests, the movement suffered from critical gaps,
preventing long-term and institutional success. The first issue was that
students’ lives at colleges are inherently temporary.128 Because students
only attend college for a few years, there was a lack of long-term projects
and subsequent follow-up on issues, resulting in a short institutional
memory. For instance, at Columbia University in 2007, a student article
criticized the university for hosting blood drives on campus despite the
homophobic policy. 129 But the year before, Columbia had hosted a
discussion panel between students and the university’s administration to
discuss their condemnation of the Blood Ban policy and advocate for its
change.130 Though well-intentioned, the movement’s lack of follow-up
and continuity of ownership prevented much of this advocacy from
making any significant gains.
In addition, student opposition to the Blood Ban has also faced
obstacles by attacking sympathetic targets—blood banks. For example,
at Tufts University, a student filed a discrimination complaint against a
community-service organization after it sponsored a blood drive hosted
by the New England Red Cross.131 But the sponsoring organization had
a handful of LGBT students as members and promoted specific AIDSrelated projects that focused on raising money for AIDS research as well
as providing services to AIDS patients. 132 Though they ultimately
compromised and students and Tufts agreed future blood drives would
the country, including members of Northeastern’s NUBiLAGA.” Katie Cray, FDA Rules Still Ban
Gay
Blood
Donations,
HUNTINGTON
NEWS
(Oct.
31,
2006),
https://huntnewsnu.com/5153/campus/fda-rules-still-ban-gay-blood-donations/
[https://perma.cc/3UAW-AYD2]
125. Pulver, supra note 6, at 119–20.
126. Id. at 120.
127. Id. at 123.
128. Id. at 122 (“Student groups are also challenged by their tendency to have little or no
institutional memory.”).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 121–22.
132. Id. at 122.

2021]

We All Bleed Red

257

also provide information about the discriminatory policy, the dispute had
the potential to create fissures amongst students and risk losing support
for the elimination of the Blood Ban.133 In attacking the “good guy”—
community-service groups that provide blood to those in need—
advocates risked losing both support and understanding for the cause.
Lastly, college movements have had difficulty advancing any
significant change because of the argument that students advanced. The
students’ argument relied almost exclusively on the premise that the
Blood Ban was unfair, created a stigma that burdened homosexual males,
and was discriminatory in nature. 134 The Blood Ban has always been
discriminatory.135 But when it began, the lack of scientific evidence and
the potential risks of AIDS-infected blood entering into the blood supply
likely outweighed discrimination concerns.136 The students’ focus on the
equality argument, however, failed to address the Ban’s objective of
securing a clean blood supply .137
Arguments that focus on eliminating discrimination—without
acknowledging the risk—developed when HIV/AIDS cases in the United
States had decreased significantly. Thus, when the college students made
this argument, the risk of contaminating the blood supply through
donations from gay men likely felt minimal.138 Nevertheless, the failure
to acknowledge the risk in this discussion made the argument less
persuasive in the mid-2000s.
College students have continued to protest the Blood Ban in the decade
following these first movements.139 The messaging and argument have
133. See id. (“While the action thus raised consciousness around the policy, it also inspired
negative attitudes towards the gay community and damaged potential alliances.”).
134. Id. at 121 (“Gay college students are responding out of a sense of indignity, based on an
idea that: ‘Homosexuality is placed in the same class as prostitution and intravenous drug use . . . .’”
(quoting Derek Link, Should Gay Men Be Allowed to Donate Blood?, TREATMENT ISSUES,
Nov./Dec. 2000, available at http://www.thebody.com/gmhc/issues/novdec00/blood.html)).
135. See id. at 124 (“The claim that blood screening is discriminatory and unjust is not new; it
is the exact same claim that was made throughout the early 1980s in resistance to various HIV
prevention policies . . ..”).
136. See McAdam & Parker, supra note 11, at 23 (“With much of the nation still gripped in fear
and ignorance, coupled with lack of scientific knowledge about HIV/AIDS, the government
thought it imperative and necessary to take action and place appropriate procedures to control the
spread of HIV/AIDS and keep the nation’s blood supply safe.”).
137. See Whitney Larkin, Comment, Discriminatory Policy: Denying Gay Men the Opportunity
to Donate Blood, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 121, 140–42 (2011) (asserting the policy is both
outdated and discriminatory). But see Pulver, supra note 6, at 127–28 (contending there still are
legitimate public health justifications for prohibiting sexually active gay men from donating blood).
138. See Pulver, supra note 6, at 121 (explaining a shift in younger people’s attitudes as time
passes since height of AIDS epidemic).
139. See Berkeley Law Students Peacefully Protest the “Gay Blood Ban”, LGBTQ+ BAR (April
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remained largely the same, and there is no evidence that these movements
have directly affected the law. In 2018, for example, law students at the
University of California at Berkeley peacefully protested the gay Blood
Ban during the law school’s first annual blood drive. The students’
messaging and presence was primarily educational, explaining to donors
that the gay Blood Ban still existed and that it was a form of
discrimination.140 One student protester claimed the policy only existed
because of persistent homophobia. 141 This student’s argument echoes
sentiments expressed by college students over the last decade.
For these reasons—1) a lack of longevity in college-based movements,
2) attacking the “good guy”, and 3) not weighing the risk versus the
discrimination—few results came from the first wave of advocacy among
college students in the mid- to late-2000s.
B. Second Wave of Advocacy—Lawmakers
Although the college protests and movements have not ceased since
their beginning in the mid-2000s, elected officials have also advocated in
recent years for the Blood Ban’s elimination.142 This previously niche
issue has now gained traction among both gay and straight lawmakers
and elected officials. This Comment will explore three arguments that
lawmakers tend to adopt when discussing the Blood Ban’s elimination.
First, some lawmakers rely on the same argument espoused by college
students: that the ban should be eliminated because it is unfair,
11, 2018), https://lgbtbar.org/bar-news/berkeley-law-students-peacefully-protest-the-gay-bloodban/ [https://perma.cc/3LAQ-3B97] (covering the LGBT student club at University of California
at Berkeley protesting the blood drive on campus to raise awareness for the MSM ban).
140. See id. (“The Berkeley Law students’ protest aimed to raise awareness of the fact that blood
collection agencies could be far more effective at ensuring blood samples are HIV-free, and far less
discriminatory, by implementing an individual risk assessment. Under this system, blood collection
agencies would defer individuals based on risky behavior rather than sexual orientation.”); id.
(“[T]he ‘Gay Blood Ban’ is rooted in blatant homophobia. There is no other explanation.” (quoting
a student protester)).
141. Id. Likely due to a lack of urgency and uncertainty that existed when the Blood Ban began,
students protesting the Ban today see only the discriminatory nature of the Ban. See Pulver, supra
note 6, at 110, 120 (discussing the history behind the MSM ban and the motivation behind the
student protests).
142. See Sam Levin, Activists Urge US to End Ban on Gay Men Donating Blood After Orlando
Massacre, GUARDIAN (June 14, 2016, 9:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/jun/14/orlando-pulse-shooting-gay-blood-ban-lgbt-rights
[https://perma.cc/92Y2STWH] (discussing the call from Democratic lawmakers to end the blood donation restrictions after
the Orlando massacre); see also H.R. Res. 989, 116th Cong. (as introduced in House, June 1, 2020)
(“Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that blood donation policies in the United
States should be equitable and based on science.”); see generally Pat Schneider, Tammy Baldwin
Says Proposed 12-Month Ban on Gay Blood Donors Discriminates, CAP TIMES (Dec. 30, 2014),
https://madison.com/ct/news/local/govt-and-politics/tammy-baldwin-says-proposed-12-monthban-on-gay-blood-donors-discriminates/article_2b0c9f33-142a-5973-8d77-282e2890d7e6.html
[https://perma.cc/5WMR-QR49].
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discriminatory, and stigmatizes gay men. 143 Second, lawmakers
acknowledge that donating blood is both a patriotic and altruistic activity
that should not be restricted based on sexual orientation. 144 Lastly, a
handful of lawmakers employ a more utilitarian argument, highlighting
the United States’ low blood supply and urgent need to increase it, which
maximizing the eligible donor pool would address.145
Perhaps the most outspoken opponent of the Blood Ban on the political
stage is Senator Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin. Since 2014 (prior to the
2015 reduction from an indefinite ban to a one-year ban), Baldwin has
advocated for the elimination of the Blood Ban.146 At this time, Baldwin
and her colleagues’ main argument was based on the policy’s
discriminatory and unfair nature.147 Baldwin authored a letter to the FDA
in 2014—joined by eighty congressional Democrats—urging the FDA to
end the Blood Ban.148 When the FDA proposed changing the lifetime ban
to a one-year deferral, the letter criticized the move as insufficient and
based not on individualized risk but rather an exclusionary, categorical
approach.149 Additionally, Baldwin and her fellow legislators adopted an
increasingly popular comparison to criticize the Ban. Lawmakers
explained that the current policy is even more unfair because it restricts a
sexually-active gay man from donating, regardless of whether he has had
safe sex, has only one sexual partner, or is regularly taking PrEP. In
contrast, the current policy allows a straight man or any woman to donate
blood regardless of how many sexual partners they have recently had or

143. See Schneider, supra note 142 (highlighting that Senator Baldwin contests the Ban because
of its discriminatory nature).
144. See Scutti, supra note 112 (explaining that two Congressmen—Jared Polis (CO) and Alan
Grayson (FL)—urged the FDA to reevaluate the Blood Ban in the wake of the Pulse nightclub
massacre).
145 . Mychael Schnell & Tony Morrison, Senators, Activists Urge FDA to Revise Blood
Donation Policy for Gay, Bisexual Men Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, ABC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2020,
10:52 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/senators-activists-urge-fda-revise-blood-donationpolicy/story?id=69879028 [https://perma.cc/HT5V-JJR8] (discussing lawmakers advocating for
the revision of the Blood Ban based on the urgent need for blood donations during the coronavirus
pandemic); see also H.R. Res. 989, 116th Cong. (as introduced in House, June 1, 2020) (advocating
for eliminating the ban given the present need for blood donations).
146. Schneider, supra note 142 (explaining Baldwin’s longstanding opposition to the Blood
Ban).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (“A one-year deferral policy, like a lifetime ban, is a categorical exclusion based solely
on the sex of an individual’s sexual partner—not his actual risk of carrying a transfusiontransmittable infection. . . . Both policies are discriminatory and both approaches are unacceptable.
Low-risk individuals who wish to donate blood and help to save lives should not be categorically
excluded because of outdated stereotypes.” (quoting letter from Tammy Baldwin, United States
Senator, to Sylvia Burwell, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs. (Dec. 15, 2014))).
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the risk level of the sexual behaviors they engage in.150
The gay community’s desire to donate blood as a selfless act to help
those in need rose to national prominence in 2016, after a mass shooting
at a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida.151 In June 2016, a shooter opened
fire at Pulse nightclub in Orlando, killing forty-nine victims. 152 In the
aftermath of this tragedy, members of the LGBT community looked for
ways to honor their friends and help the injured.153 Local blood banks in
Orlando issued urgent calls for members of the community to come
donate blood to assist the dozens of people injured in the shooting.154 But
the Blood Ban prevented many gay men from helping their friends and
community members, making many feel the discriminatory policy’s sting
in a more personal way than perhaps ever before. 155 This sense of
injustice and helplessness motivated lawmakers across the country to
speak out against the policy with a new, more empathetic fervor.156
Following the tragedy in Orlando, Senator Baldwin joined twentythree other senators in another letter to the FDA that urged the agency to
eliminate the twelve-month ban on gay blood donations. 157 Baldwin
150. See id. (“Rights groups say that current policy is unfair because it blocks a sexually active
gay man from donating even if he has had only one sexual partner, has protected sex, and has not
been exposed to HIV, but allows sexually active heterosexual men and women who may have been
exposed to HIV to donate. They also argue that the lifetime ban stigmatizes homosexuality, making
it seem like being gay is a risk in and of itself.”).
151. Camila Domonoske, Blood Banks See Massive Response After Orlando Attack, NPR (June
12, 2016, 7:44 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/06/12/481795633/bloodbanks-see-massive-response-after-orlando-attack [https://perma.cc/D8BJ-U7XD]; see generally
Alyson Hurt & Ariel Zambelich, 3 Hours in Orlando: Piecing Together an Attack and Its
Aftermath, NPR (June 26, 2016, 5:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/06/16/482322488/orlandoshooting-what-happened-update [https://perma.cc/Z5QS-3BR9] (detailing the mass shooting in
Orlando).
152. Hurt & Zambelich, supra note 151.
153. Id.
154. See Levin, supra note 142 (“In the wake of the deadliest US mass shooting in modern
history, which also left more than 50 people injured on Sunday, local blood banks in Florida issued
urgent calls for donations. But gay men who wanted to donate blood to people recovering from the
attack at Pulse nightclub were unable to offer their support.”).
155. See id. (“To be denied [a tangible way to support members of the gay community] by an
outdated rule that’s really based more on prejudice than science at this point is hurtful . . . It reminds
us that in many ways, our civil rights are still not fully recognized throughout the country.” (quoting
an HIV advocate)); see also id. (“It adds insult to injury. Here we have someone who murders 50
of our brothers and sisters, and then our own government turns around and says we’re not allowed
to help them simply because we’re gay. . . . There is no basis in science for this ban, and that is
pure and simple discrimination.” (quoting a member of the gay community in San Francisco)).
156. Id. (“On . . . World Blood Donor Day, a group of Democratic lawmakers sent a letter to
the FDA noting that there is a dire need for blood in Orlando and urging federal officials to
eliminate the 12-month regulation.”).
157. Amanda Magnus, Senator Tammy Baldwin on Blood Donation Restrictions for Gay Men
and Senate Gun Votes, WIS. PUB. RADIO, at 01:47 (June 22, 2016, 6:05 PM),
https://www.wpr.org/listen/949756 [https://perma.cc/3JHC-5SPH] (“I certainly was moved to
speak out again on this after the horrific shooting in Orlando.”).
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called on the FDA to approach blood donations scientifically instead of
categorically excluding donors. 158 Baldwin explained that a more
individualized screening process would achieve this objective.159 In an
interview with Wisconsin Public Radio, Baldwin stressed these points
and also explained that there are safeguards and redundancies in the
blood-screening process to ensure blood is not infected with HIV.160 In
addition to Baldwin and her colleagues in the Senate, two members of the
House of Representatives—Jared Polis (CO) and Alan Grayson (FL)—
also urged the FDA to reevaluate its policies.161 After the shooting in
Orlando, Grayson made a statement highlighting the Blood Ban’s
unfairness in the wake of a tragedy where the gay community was denied
the opportunity help their fallen friends and family. 162 Despite
Congress’s calls for the FDA to end the ban and create a less
discriminatory system, the agency refused to change.163 Instead, the FDA
stressed that the deferment practice relied on scientific data and that its
policies would be reevaluated based on any newly available data.164 The
Ban remained intact.
Most recently, lawmakers have made an argument that gained
significant traction in 2020 and has been regarded as the primary
motivator behind the Blood Ban’s most recent modification—shortening
the year-long deferment period to three months.165 When the COVID-19
global pandemic began, the United States witnessed a drop-off in blood
donations as thousands of blood drives were canceled because of socialdistancing rules and worries about the spread of the novel coronavirus.166
To combat this issue, the FDA announced in early April 2020 that the
Blood Ban’s deferral period would be relaxed from one year to three

158. Id. at 03:25.
159. Id. at 03:10.
160. Id. at 04:01.
161. See Scutti, supra note 112 (explaining Polis and Grayson’s attempts to challenge the Blood
Ban).
162. See id. (“Florida Rep. Alan Grayson . . . suggested using this month’s Pulse nightclub
shootings to show renewed respect for people’s rights. He said blood donation screening should be
based on science and a donor’s safe and monogamous sexual behavior, no matter their
orientation.”).
163. See Levin, supra note 142 (explaining the FDA’s stance on deferral policies).
164 . See id. (“[T]he FDA would reevaluate its policies ‘as new scientific data becomes
available.’”).
165. See REVISED RECS., supra note 6, at 6, 8–9 (outlining the purpose and current status of the
FDA MSM policy).
166. See Shaw, supra note 6 (“The FDA has announced a relaxing of its restrictions on gay men
being allowed to donate blood, in light of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
Red Cross figures in March showed a drop-off of 86,000 fewer blood donations across the United
States, due to almost 2700 blood drives that had to be cancelled.”).
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months to increase the size of the potential donor pool.167 The motivation
to increase the size of the blood pool by including gay men is not
unfounded. The Williams Institute on Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity Law at the University of California, Los Angeles, estimated that
the ban’s elimination would result in more than 600,000 additional pints
of donated blood, resulting in aid to more than one million individuals.168
The change to a three-month deferral occurred after significant outcry
from elected officials.169 Interestingly, the argument has gained traction
based on a premise that directly opposes the one the Ban’s creation was
based on: blood from gay men will help the United States, instead of the
forty-year-old justification that blood from gay men will hurt the United
States. Accordingly, groups of lawmakers have proposed bills using this
exact justification for why the Blood Ban should be eliminated. 170
Career-long advocate Senator Baldwin, joined by various prominent
United States senators (including Elizabeth Warren (MA), Corey Booker
(NJ), and Bernie Sanders (VT)), wrote a letter to FDA Commissioner Dr.
Stephen Hahn urging him to reevaluate “discriminatory blood donation
policies” in light of the blood shortage to save American lives.171
Following the waiting period’s reduction from one year to three
months, lawmakers continued to urge the FDA to eliminate the ban
altogether, using the same argument.172 On June 1, 2020, Congressman
Adam Schiff—along with other prominent Representatives—introduced
a resolution that called on the FDA to eliminate the Ban, as it was
discriminatory and not based in science.173
The resolution employed a familiar argument: there was a tangible
need for more blood donations during the pandemic, with 130,000 fewer
167. Id. (explaining the FDA’s decision to reduce the deferment period to three months in an
effort to increase the donor pool in light of blood shortages caused by the COVID-19 pandemic).
168. Schnell & Morrison, supra note 145.
169. See Shaw, supra note 6 (highlighting the pressure that lawmakers put on the FDA to
reassess the policy amid the coronavirus pandemic).
170. Letter from Tammy Baldwin, U.S. Senator for Wisconsin, to Stephen M. Hahn, Comm’r,
U.S.
Food
&
Drug
Admin.
(Mar.
26,
2020),
https://www.baldwin.senate
.gov/imo/media/doc/FDA%20MSM%20Blood%20Donor%20Deferral%20Policy%20Letter%200
3262020_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HB5F-XSJH ] [hereinafter Letter to Hahn]; Donald Padgett,
New U.S. Resolution Renews Calls to End ‘Gay Blood Ban’, OUT (June 3, 2020, 11:39 AM),
https://www.out.com/health/2020/6/03/new-us-resolution-renews-calls-end-gay-blood-ban
[https://perma.cc/GBA7-7EMJ].
171. Letter to Hahn, supra note 170.
172. See Padgett, supra note 170 (“Noting the need for policies grounded in science rather than
fear and bias, a coalition of Democratic House representatives have introduced a resolution that
calls for the elimination of deferral periods for queer men wanting to donate blood by the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA).”).
173. See H.R. Res. 989, 116th Cong. (as introduced in House, June 1, 2020) (demanding that
the FDA create a new policy that is “grounded in science” and does not “unfairly single out any
group of individuals”).
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blood donations after more than 4,000 blood drives were canceled.174 The
resolution criticized the three-month deferral by saying it was still overly
stringent and not scientifically grounded. 175 Furthermore, the
resolution’s authors reiterated the contention that the policy is unfair and
discriminatory because it treats straight men and bisexual or gay men
differently based solely on their sexual orientation.176 But the majority of
the resolution concentrated on the urgent need for blood and the scientific
evidence for safe screening procedures.177
Though the utilitarian argument that the United States needs more
blood is attractive to many and helps justify the elimination of the Ban—
along with safety assurances from scientific advances to screen blood—
this argument does suffer one key criticism, akin to the reaction when
people called for the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” because there was
a troop shortage.178 This criticism, in short, points out that gay soldiers
and gay blood are only acceptable when the United States is in desperate
need of them.179 In other words, under normal circumstances, gay blood
is not good enough and discrimination against gays is acceptable;
however, in the nation’s hour of need, gay blood will suffice just fine—
regardless of any justice-based argument to ameliorate discriminatory
policies.
Regardless of the argument used, there are a handful of avenues to
challenge the Blood Ban. At least one of these will likely succeed in
finally dismantling the Blood Ban.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Judicial Challenge
In order for the Blood Ban to come onto the docket of the Supreme

174. See id. (“[M]ore than 4,000 blood drives across the United States have been canceled due
to the COVID–19 pandemic, resulting in approximately 130,000 fewer donations . . . .”).
175. See id. (“[A] 3-month deferral policy for gay and bisexual men to donate blood remains
overly stringent given the scientific evidence, advanced testing methods, and the safety and quality
control measures in place within the different FDA-qualified blood donating centers . . . .”).
176. See id. (“[A] double standard remained as the revised policy continued to treat gay and
bisexual men differently from others.”).
177. Id.
178. See Pulver, supra note 6, at 124 (“Like calls to repeal ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ in a time of
troop shortage . . . .”). But see JODY FEDER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40795, “DON’T ASK, DON’T
TELL”: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 3–4 (2013) (focusing on the need to reconcile the deference the Court
has given Congress and the Executive Branch in establishing military rules with the safe harbor for
homosexual conduct between consenting adults established in Lawrence v. Texas).
179. See Pulver, supra note 6, at 124 (“[T]his argument has a dangerous undertone that gay
blood (or soldiers) is ‘good enough’ only when other options have been exhausted.”); see also
FEDER, supra note 178, at 13 (noting troop shortage as one factor Congress considered when
deciding to repeal DADT as a matter of public policy).
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Court of the United States, there would have to be a plaintiff who has
been injured by the Blood Ban—in other words, a gay man unable to give
blood due to the Ban.180 There have been two tangential challenges to the
Blood Ban in courts over the last few years; however, the complaints
failed to directly challenge the constitutionality of the Blood Ban. Instead,
they disputed the Ban’s application in specific instances. 181 In these
cases, two transgender women brought actions against a plasma
collection center for denying their ability to donate plasma under the
MSM Ban. 182 Both cases challenged the Ban’s applicability to
transgender women who had never had sexual contact with males, as
opposed to validity of the Ban itself.183 In Kaiser v. CSL Plasma, the
court focused on the fact that the FDA has provided no specific
instructions or guidance restricting transgender women from donating
blood or plasma under the MSM Ban and, therefore, it was
inapplicable.184 In Kaiser, the court did not opine on the soundness of the
Ban itself but found Ms. Kaiser had stated a claim, which was ultimately
settled outside the court. 185 In Scott v. CSL Plasma, Ms. Scott also
brought an action against CSL Plasma for denying her ability to donate

180 .
Standing, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu
/wex/standing [https://perma.cc/7JRJ-QTPR] (last visited Oct. 20, 2020) (explaining the requisite
standing to sue in federal courts).
181. See Kaiser v. CSL Plasma Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1132 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (addressing
a transgender woman’s claim that the Ban was wrongly applied to her); see also Scott v. CSL
Plasma, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 3d 961, 963 (D. Minn. 2015) (addressing a transgender woman’s claim
that she was discriminated against when she was not allowed to donate “due to sex change operation
and hormone replacement medication”).
182. Kaiser, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 1132; Scott, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 963.
183. See Kaiser, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 1137 (explaining that Ms. Kaiser had been denied based on
her transgender status and that she was “simply ask[ing] Defendant to stop ‘deferring’ donations
based only on gender identity”); see also Scott, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 963 (describing the basis for
Scott’s cause of action).
184. See Kaiser, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 1139 (“The FDA has never issued direct guidance on the
eligibility of transgender donors and, most recently, has proposed leaving the question within the
discretion of medical directors, suggesting that one typical rationale for invoking the primary
jurisdiction doctrine—promoting uniformity and consistency—is not compelling in this case.”);
see also Gabe Verdugo & Isaac Ruiz, Lawsuit Challenging For-Profit Plasma Company’s Refusal
of Transgender Donor Is Resolved, KELLER ROHRBACK L. OFFS. (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://www.kellerrohrback.com/news/lawsuit-challenging-for-profit-plasma-companys-refusalof-transgender-do [https://perma.cc/4ZJW-9EUR] (“Judge Martinez agreed with Ms. Kaiser that
federal law does not shield CSL Plasma from her claims brought under Washington state law. Judge
Martinez noted in his ruling that CSL Plasma had failed to provide any guideline, regulation, or
law that requires the wholesale rejection of donations from transgender people by plasma collection
centers.”).
185. See Kaiser, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 1134 (granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment); see Verdugo & Ruiz, supra note 184 (highlighting that the parties settled soon after
Judge Martinez’s ruling, and two months prior to the case’s scheduled trial date).
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plasma based on her transgender status.186 Similarly, the judge in Scott
denied CSL’s motion for summary judgment based on the specific facts
of Ms. Scott’s case, without considering the soundness of the Blood Ban
policy. 187 Unlike Kaiser, however, a federal jury decided Ms. Scott’s
case and found in favor of CSL because CSL had a legitimate business
purpose under Minnesota law to refuse Ms. Scott’s donation.188
If the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari to review a Blood Ban
challenge, it is still unclear what standard of review its analysis would
apply. The majority in Bostock was careful not to exercise heightened
scrutiny. 189 But the dissent, legal pundits, and a subsequent case
addressing transgender rights have interpreted Bostock as an application
of heightened scrutiny. 190 This points to ambiguity regarding the
applicable standard of review when analyzing sexual orientation
discrimination.
On one hand, some case law suggests rational basis review would
apply.191 On the other hand, liberally extending the language of Bostock,
186. See Scott, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 962 (“Lisa Scott is a transgender woman who attempted to
give plasma at a collection center run by defendant CSL Plasma . . . but was rejected because she
is transgender. She has asserted a single cause of action against CSL for unlawful discrimination
. . . .”); see MINN. STAT. § 363A.17(3) (2020) (prohibiting businesses from discriminating based
on sex or sexual orientation unless the discrimination is rooted in a “legitimate business purpose”).
187. See Scott, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 963 (“Although the parties’ arguments at times invoke broader
concerns regarding the fairness and propriety of federal guidance on plasma donor eligibility, such
policy concerns are not properly before the Court, and the Court does not address them.”).
188. See Special Verdict Form at 1, Scott v. CSL Plasma, Inc., No. 13-2616 (D. Minn. Mar. 9,
2016), ECF No. 136 (expressing the findings of the federal jury in favor of CSL); see also Dominic
Holden, Transgender Woman Loses Anti-Discrimination Case Against Blood Bank, BUZZFEED
(March 18, 2016, 5:28 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/dominicholden/transgenderwoman-loses-anti-discrimination-case-against-blo [https://perma.cc/T8EB-B7WQ] (explaining
the verdict in Scott); see MINN. STAT. § 363A.17 (“It is an unfair discriminatory practice for a
person engaged in a trade or business or in the provision of a service: . . . (3) . . . to discriminate . . .
[based on] sex, sexual orientation . . . unless the alleged refusal or discrimination is because of a
legitimate business purpose.”).
189. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738–39 (2020) (analyzing Title VII according
to the ordinary public meaning of the statute’s language); see Gruberg, supra note 94 (“Despite the
holding’s language and Bostock’s focus on firing under Title VII, the potential impact of the
decision is much broader: The Supreme Court’s opinion states that ‘it is impossible to discriminate
against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual
based on sex.’”).
190. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the “gravitational pull” the
Court’s opinion may exert in other constitutional cases); Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 973–
74 (D. Idaho 2020) (noting that sex-based discrimination cases require heightened scrutiny and
suggesting Bostock lends support to this approach); see Gruberg, supra note 94 (explaining that the
definition of the majority in Bostock could be applied to Equal Protection discussions in the future).
191. See Ian Bartrum, The Ninth Circuit’s Treatment of Sexual Orientation: Defining “Rational
Basis Review with Bite”, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 142, 145–46 (2014) (noting that
although sexual orientation is historically assessed under rational basis review, courts have used
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which interprets Title VII to include sexual orientation in “sex,” would
lead one to assume that the Court would apply intermediate scrutiny as it
had in other sex-based discrimination cases. 192 This Comment will
explore how a challenge to the Blood Ban may be assessed under either
of the applicable standards of review. Moreover, this Comment asserts
the Blood Ban is illegitimate under both standards.
1. Defeating the Blood Ban at Rational Basis
Rational basis is the lowest level of scrutiny.193 It holds that a law that
restricts an activity is constitutional if it addresses a legitimate state
interest and is rationally related to said interest.194 Courts apply rational
basis review to legislation that distinguishes between people based on
age, mental disability, or other attributes considered non-suspect. 195 If
the restriction is not arbitrary or capricious, it will often pass
constitutional muster under rational basis review.196 In gay-rights cases,
the Supreme Court has been careful not to establish sexual orientation as
a suspect classification.197 Notably, the Court used rational basis review
more of a “rational basis review with bite” established in Lawrence v. Texas) (quoting Gerald
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20–22 (1972)); see generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 632 (1996).
192. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Alito focused
on the consequences of the majority opinion’s decision to expand the definition of sex to include
sexual orientation and transgender status. He foresaw the possibility for this definition to influence
constitutional and equal rights analyses, triggering a heightened level of scrutiny that was not
afforded to sexual orientation or transgender status prior to Bostock. Id. This foresight proved
accurate, as lower court judges have already applied Bostock’s rationale to other contexts. See
Gruberg, supra note 94 (“In his reasoning for applying heightened scrutiny to the Idaho law, [an
Idaho federal district judge] cited the Supreme Court’s statement in Bostock affirming that one
cannot discriminate against an individual for being transgender without also discriminating against
that individual based on sex.”); see generally Hecox, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 973–74 (applying Bostock
to validate a higher level of scrutiny).
193. See Rational Basis Test, supra note 39 (“To pass the rational basis test, the statute or
ordinance must have a legitimate state interest, and there must be a rational connection between the
statute’s/ordinance’s means and goals.”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is
Constitutional (and Desirable), 14 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 401 (2016) (“Under the Carolene
Products framework, the rational basis test is the minimum level of review. Under equal protection,
all classifications must at least meet this level of review . . . .”).
194. Rational Basis Test, supra note 39.
195. See Rational Basis Test, supra note 39 (“The rational basis test is generally used when in
cases where no fundamental rights or suspect classifications are at issue.”).
196. Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C. L. REV. 721,
727 (2014) (explaining the origin of the “arbitrary and capricious” test in rational basis review).
197. See Strasser, supra note 70, at 88 (“The Obergefell Court suggested that equal protection
informed its decision, while at the same time not recognizing sexual orientation as a protected class.
Perhaps in light of Romer, Lawrence, Windsor and Obergefell the Court will soon announce that
orientation is suspect or quasi-suspect. Perhaps not.”); see Courtney A. Powers, Finding LGBTs a
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in one of the early landmark sex-discrimination cases, which suggests the
Blood Ban may be reviewed under the same level of scrutiny. 198
Therefore, though a higher level of scrutiny might apply, it is appropriate
to first assess a challenge to the Blood Ban under rational basis review.
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Reed v. Reed, declaring that an
Idaho statute was unconstitutional because it discriminated on the basis
of sex and did not further any rational state objective. 199 In Reed, the
Court overturned an Idaho law that automatically selected a deceased
child’s father—instead of the child’s mother—as administrator of the
child’s will.200 Reed is an important case for women’s rights, but it also
has influential consequences for general Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence.201 The Court held that discriminatory laws are not prima
facie illegal, and the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny states the
power to treat different classes of people in different ways. 202
Nevertheless, the Court applied a rational basis test in analyzing the Idaho
statute and determined that a non-suspect classification of people must be
reasonable, cannot be arbitrary, and must have substantial relation to the
legislation’s objective.203 When Reed was decided, the Court only had
two tests for analyzing equal-protection claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment: rational basis and strict scrutiny.204 Again, courts routinely
upheld laws assessed under a rational basis test.205
Thus, Reed’s analysis and holding under rational basis review is
notable for two reasons. First, rational basis review in Reed did not
designate sex as a suspect classification, which would afford it strict
Suspect Class: Assessing the Political Power of LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s Application of
Heightened Scrutiny, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 385, 387 (2010) (“But neither the Supreme
Court, nor the majority of state courts, have considered sexual orientation a suspect classification
or applied heightened scrutiny to statutes distinguishing on that basis.”).
198. See Wexler, supra note 41, at 44 (“But the Court’s opinion simply applied the rationality
standard without mentioning the possibility of adopting anything more stringent.”).
199. Id. at 43–44; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72–73, 76 (1971).
200. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76–77; see Wexler, supra note 41, at 41 (“[T]he Court struck down a
state law on the ground that it discriminated against women in violation of the equal protection
clause.”).
201. See Wexler, supra note 41, at 44 (“[B]ecause the reasonableness test was so malleable,
challenges to discriminatory legislation [under the Fourteenth Amendment] would now have to be
resolved on a case-by-case basis.”).
202. Reed, 404 U.S. at 75.
203. Id. at 76 (“The question presented . . . is whether a difference in the sex of competing
applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought
to be advanced by the operation [of the statute].”).
204. Emily Martin, Reed v. Reed at 40: A Landmark Decision, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Nov.
16, 2011), https://nwlc.org/blog/reed-v-reed-40-landmark-decision/ [https://perma.cc/MDC24VRD] (explaining the relevance of Reed to the women’s rights movement).
205. Id. (“Laws, including those that relied on gender-based classifications, were virtually
always upheld under this test.”).
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scrutiny.206 Second, Reed’s holding diverged from the common practice
of upholding laws under rational review. The Court found that the Idaho
statute’s arbitrary preference in favor of males was incompatible with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the law.207
The Court found that if a law that distinguished between the sexes was
arbitrary, then even most generous standard of review would deem it
unconstitutional and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.208 The
Court explained:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members
of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the
merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and
whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily
controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated
solely on the basis of sex.209

Like the classification of sex in Reed v. Reed, the Court in Romer v.
Evans held that laws making distinctions based on sexual orientation
would also be assessed under rational basis review.210 Notwithstanding
subsequent gender and gay-rights cases, under Reed and Romer, it is
appropriate to apply rational basis review to a potential challenge against
the gay Blood Ban.
For a law to be held constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
using rational basis review, it must be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest. 211 The government’s interest in mitigating the

206. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (“The question presented . . . is whether a difference in the sex of
competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship . . . .”); see also
Catherine G. Noonan, Note, Reed v. Reed, 2 TEX. S. U. L. REV. 329, 331–32 (1973) (“In studying
the Reed case it appears to be of very limited use in either expanding the concept of the Equal
Protection Clause or in changing women’s class status in the eyes of the Supreme Court. . . . It
employed only the ‘reasonable classification’ test.”).
207. Reed, 404 U.S. at 74 (“[T]hat the arbitrary preference established in favor of males by §
15-314 of the Idaho Code cannot stand in the face of the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that
no State deny the equal protection of the laws to any person within its jurisdiction.”).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 76–77.
210. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (“Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous
with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus
toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”).
211. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303–05 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding
a local ordinance prohibiting pushcart vendors in the French Quarter unless they had operated there
for at least eight years permissible under the Equal Protection Clause because it was rationally
related to the government’s goal in regulating commerce and promoting tourism); Raphael
Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2074 (2015) (“Traditionally, rational-basis review is extremely deferential
to legislatures’ enactments. A statutory classification comports with the Equal Protection Clause if
it is ‘rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’” (quoting Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303)).
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spread of disease and having a healthy populace is certainly legitimate.212
The relationship between a healthy populace through the Blood Ban
ostensibly to limit AIDS’ spread, however, is not rational today.
2. Legitimate Government Interest
Admittedly, when the AIDS crisis broke out, the government’s interest
in preserving public health could have been rationally related to the Blood
Ban. During a time of confusion and inadequate information, the Blood
Ban rationally connected a community that seemed highly susceptible
and an activity that seemed to be linked to infections.213 However, the
relationship is no longer rational because of the discriminatory nature of
the Blood Ban and the lack of scientific evidence linking categorically
unsafe blood to the gay community.214
Even under rational basis review, the Court is clear that laws
established with discriminatory animus are not constitutional. 215 The
Court has held that a bare desire to harm an unpopular group is not
enough to constitute a legitimate governmental interest.216 Therefore, the
Blood Ban may be unconstitutional based solely on the fact that it is
212. State and local governments have enacted legislation limiting the liberties of some for the
general health of others in a handful of instances, especially those relating to smoking and tobacco
laws. Jessica Niezgoda, Note, Kicking Ash(Trays): Smoking Bans in Public Workplaces, Bars, and
Restaurants - Current Laws, Constitutional Challenges, and Proposed Federal Regulation, 33 J.
LEGIS. 99, 99 (2006); see also Lexington Fayette Cnty. Food & Beverage Ass’n v. LexingtonFayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 131 S.W.3d 745, 752 (Ky. 2004) (“The fact that an exercise of police
power impinges upon private interest does not restrict reasonable regulation.”).
213. See Evatt, supra note 18, at 2295–96 (discussing the emergence of AIDS as a disease
originally thought of as specific to gay men, but that could infect others, such as hemophiliacs,
through blood donations).
214. Matthew L. Morrison, Note, Bad Blood: An Examination of the Constitutional Deficiencies
of the FDA’s Gay Blood Ban, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2363, 2364 (2015) (“Though the FDA currently
cites statistics to justify its policies, many argue that the guidelines are now outdated and no longer
based on ‘sound science.’ Others contend that the ban is discriminatory and, as such,
unconstitutional under U.S. law.”); see Gillian Mohney, FDA Ban on Gay Men as Blood Donors
Opposed by American Medical Association, ABC NEWS (June 19, 2013, 9:41 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/american-medical-association-opposes-fda-ban-gaymen/story?id=19436366 [https://perma.cc/SC2V-RR9R] (explaining the lack of scientific support
for the Blood Ban).
215. See Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 211, at 2093 (“Animus can be understood as the
impermissible purpose of ‘harnessing the public laws to reflect and enforce private bias,’ as
opposed to a legitimate public purpose. The Court has established the presence of animus in two
ways: through ‘direct evidence of private bias in the legislative record,’ and through ‘an inference
of animus based on the structure of a law.’” (quoting Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional
Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 926 (2012))); see generally U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
216. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. The Supreme Court in Moreno found that a provision of the
Food Stamp Act denying food stamps to households of “unrelated persons” was a violation of equal
protection because denying food stamps to households of unrelated persons was not rationally
connected to the government’s goal to prevent fraud, but instead, was found to be simply targeted
at an unpopular group. Id. at 534–36.
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grounded in discrimination and a harmful stereotype that conflates the
entire gay community with the AIDS virus.217 Additionally, medical and
scientific progress further supports the proposition that the Blood Ban is
irrational and now based only on outdated prejudice.218
B. Scientific Progress Reduces Rational Relation
Preventive medicine and education, along with the CDC policy for
testing all donated blood for HIV, have rendered the Blood Ban irrational.
To assess the rationality of the Ban, it is necessary to determine whether
the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the gay community is significant enough
to justify excluding the entire class of gay men.
First, HIV transmission has decreased, and education and preventative
medication and measures have increased, among gay men. 219
Accordingly, Americans have recognized that AIDS is not simply a gay
disease, as believed in the 1980s and at the inception of the Blood Ban.220
Since Ban’s inception in the mid-1980s, annual infections in the United
States have decreased by more than two-thirds.221 Though the reduction
has slowed, HIV diagnoses in the United States decreased by 9 percent
between 2015 and 2019.222 Furthermore, HIV diagnoses among men who
have sex with men also decreased by 9 percent in the same timeframe,
whereas HIV diagnoses have remained stable among people who inject

217. See Pulver, supra note 6, at 110 (“But the story of the restriction on blood donations by
men who have sex with men is essentially the story of the early days of AIDS itself, and because
of this history and the political and rhetorical power of AIDS today, any attempt to isolate the MSM
policy will fail.”); see Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal
protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” (quoting Moreno,
413 U.S. at 534)).
218. See Shaw, supra note 6 (“The FDA’s decision to ease restrictions on blood donations from
men who have sex with men proves what medical experts have been saying for decades: that this
ban is not based in science but rather discriminatory politics.”).
219. Liz Highleyman, PrEP Scales Up, HIV Incidence Declines, S.F. AIDS FOUND. (Aug. 8,
2018),
https://www.sfaf.org/collections/beta/prep-scales-up-hiv-incidence-declines/
[https://perma.cc/9ZSE-GWUE] (explaining recent statistics related to the decline in AIDS
prevalence among gay men and the rise in PrEP and education).
220 . See Wright, supra note 16 (highlighting early stereotypes around the emergence of
AIDS—notably, the early name of AIDS as “gay cancer”—and how these misconceptions and
stereotypes persist); see Pulver, supra note 6, at 121 (“[T]he fear of HIV amongst gay males caused
by the MSM policy is nowhere near the levels experienced throughout the 1980s.”).
221 .
U.S. Statistics, HIV.GOV, https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/overview/data-andtrends/statistics [https://perma.cc/M5JW-RQDK] (last visited Sept. 27, 2021) (comparing statistics
on HIV/AIDS in the U.S. based on time, demographics, or geographic focus from the start of the
AIDS epidemic until 2019).
222. See id. (“[I]n 2019, 36,801 people received an HIV diagnosis in the U.S. and 6 dependent
areas—an overall 9% decrease compared with 2015.”).
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drugs.223 Though men who have sex with men still constitute the majority
of new HIV cases in the United States, approximately one-third of new
diagnoses are among those not involved in MSM activities.224 Even more
notably, nearly 23 percent of new diagnoses in 2019 were in
heterosexuals and were not linked to drug use—individuals who would
likely elude current screening questions for blood donation exclusion.225
In addition to HIV diagnoses’ downward trend among gay men,
innovations in health care have also played an important role in the
reduction of HIV/AIDS prevalence among gay men and constitute a
further challenge to the rationality of the Blood Ban. Specifically, the
introduction of the publicly available PrEP drug has aided in the battle
against HIV/AIDS in gay men. 226 Studies have shown the increase in
PrEP usage correlates with the decline in new HIV infections. 227 In
addition to the annual increase of PrEP usage, recall that former President
Trump contracted with drug manufacturer Gilead to donate PrEP
medication to up to 200,000 individuals for up to eleven years in an effort
to end the HIV epidemic by 2030.228
223 . HIV in the United States and Dependent Areas, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION
|
HIV,
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/statistics/overview/ataglance.html
[https://perma.cc/5WC4-HBB6] (last visited Oct. 3, 2021) (noting that while the percentage of HIV
diagnoses attributable to people who inject drugs (“PWID”) remained stable from 2015 to 2019,
HIV diagnoses among men who have sex with men fell by 9 percent).
224. See id. (noting heterosexuals accounted for 23 percent of new HIV diagnoses, while PWID
accounted for about 7 percent; roughly 69 percent of new HIV diagnoses were among men who
have sex with men).
225. Id.; see also Full Length Donor History Questionnaire (DHQ), AMERICAN ASS’N OF
BLOOD
BANKS
(Apr.
2020)
https://www.aabb.org/tm/questionnaires/Documents/
dhq/v2/DHQ%20v2.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ3S-V3ZP] (listing the questions asked of
prospective blood donors).
226 . See PrEP Effectiveness, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION | HIV,
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/prep/prep-effectiveness.html [https://perma.cc/6L4U-24M7] (last
visited Nov. 7, 2020) (“PrEP reduces the risk of getting HIV from sex by about 99 percent when
taken as prescribed.”); see also About PrEP, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION | HIV,
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/prep/about-prep.html
[https://perma.cc/XH4N-LMEB]
(last
visited Nov 7, 2020) (“PrEP (pre-exposure prophylaxis) is medicine people at risk for HIV take to
prevent getting HIV from sex or injection drug use.”).
227. See Liz Highleyman, PrEP Use Linked to Few New HIV Infections in US States, AIDSMAP
(July 26, 2018), https://www.aidsmap.com/news/jul-2018/prep-use-linked-fewer-new-hivinfections-us-states [https://perma.cc/3PNQ-8X2N] (“As pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) use
continues to grow, epidemiological evidence is starting to show an association between increases
in PrEP uptake and declines in new infections.”); see also Jules Levin, The Impact of Pre-exposure
Prophylaxis with TDF/FTC on HIV Diagnoses, 2012–2016, United States, 22ND INT’L AIDS CONF.
(July 2018), https://www.natap.org/2018/IAC/IAC_17.htm [https://perma.cc/6E5W-8VG6]
(reporting on the 22nd International AIDS Conference and its discussion of Patrick Sullivan’s and
his colleagues’ research showing a simultaneous decrease in HIV diagnoses while PrEP usage
increased).
228 . See Trump Administration Secures, supra note 101 (discussing how the Trump
Administration secured PrEP donations from Gilead for up to 200,000 individuals for up to eleven
years).
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If the decrease of HIV among gay men were the only factor at play,
the Ban might still meet the rational basis test.229 But the disentanglement
of gay men and AIDS, as well as the testing of all blood donations, further
weakens the link between the Blood Ban and the government’s means to
safeguard public health.
All blood is now tested for a series of infectious disease pathogens
following donation.230 CDC policy mandates that all donated blood used
for transfusion be tested for certain types of infectious disease pathogens,
such as hepatitis B and C viruses and human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV). 231 Blood is tested for HIV-1 and HIV-2 using nucleic acid
amplification to detect the virus’s existence as well as to the presence of
antibodies; the former is nearly 100 percent accurate.232 The testing of
donated blood began to detect antibodies for HIV-1 in 1985 and has
continuously improved throughout the last almost four decades—now
including the detection of HIV-2 antibodies and the virus itself for both
HIV-1 and HIV-2.233 With these scientific tools available, researchers
have been able to test and explore potential impacts of lifting the Blood
Ban. 234 After the Blood Ban’s modification from a lifelong ban to a
twelve-month deferral in 2015, researchers were able to monitor any
changes to HIV occurrence in the donated blood pool.235

229. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 452 (1998) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“It is unlikely . . .
that any gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive heightened scrutiny, but under
rational scrutiny, a statute may be defended based on generalized classifications unsupported by
empirical evidence.”).
230 .
Blood Safety Basics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/bloodsafety/basics.html [https://perma.cc/PL6A-KDXT] (last visited Nov. 7,
2020) (“All blood for transfusion is tested for evidence of certain infectious disease pathogens, such
as hepatitis B and C viruses and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).”).
231. Id.
232. Id. (describing the different tests used to detect each specific disease that must be screened
under CDC mandates); see also Susan Bernstein & Jonathan E. Kaplan, Which HIV Tests Are Most
Accurate?, WEBMD (June 6, 2020), https://www.webmd.com/hiv-aids/hiv-tests-accurate
[https://perma.cc/PKC7-HDRP] (explaining the statistical accuracy of different types of HIV tests).
233. Eve M. Lackritz et al., U.S. Public Health Service Guidelines for Testing and Counseling
Blood and Plasma Donors for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 Antigen, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(Mar.
1,
1996),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00040546.htm [https://perma.cc/RG57-QC5L]
(explaining the evolution of early HIV blood testing).
234. Donald G. McNeil Jr., F.D.A. Ends Ban, Allowing Some Blood Donations by Gay Men,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/22/health/fda-ends-ban-allowingsome-blood-donations-by-gay-men.html [https://perma.cc/T3L3-SC7Q] (noting that a few
different organizations have called for the repeal of the Blood Ban based on relevant scientific data
and statistics).
235. See Eduard Grebe et al., HIV Incidence in US First-Time Blood Donors and Transfusion
Risk with a 12-Month Deferral for Men Who Have Had Sex with Men, 136 BLOOD 1359, 1359
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When comparing the incidences of HIV in the blood supply before the
modification of the Blood Ban and after, researchers from the American
Society of Hematology found no increase in HIV incidence or HIVtransmission risk through transfusions. 236 In addition to independently
conducted research, the FDA has also investigated its current policies
through the Blood Products Advisory Committee (BPAC), which
published its meeting notes and discussions beginning in 2006.237 Upon
the publication of these studies, the American Association of Blood
Banks, the American Red Cross, and the Advisory Committee on Blood
Safety and Availability issued a joint statement to the FDA urging more
rational and scientifically grounded deferral periods applied more fairly
across all possible blood donors.238 Thus, the availability of scientific and
medical approaches to mitigate the risk of HIV entering the donated
blood supply supports a finding that the Blood Ban is irrational, and thus
unconstitutional, under an equal-protection claim.
Lastly, other countries’ success in eliminating their own versions of
the Blood Ban further establishes the irrationality of the Ban in the United
States. Italy and Spain—along with a handful of other countries—have
eliminated their MSM bans altogether and instead opted for risk-based
deferral questions. 239 Notably, these countries do not include any

(2020), https://ashpublications.org/blood/article-abstract/136/11/1359/461434/HIV-incidence-inUS-first-time-blood-donors-and?redirectedFrom=fulltext
[https://perma.cc/5VKC-DSFK]
(explaining the potential impact and minimal risk of reducing or eliminating deferral period for gay
men).
236. See id. at 1363 (“We did not observe any evidence that a cohort of new higher-risk male
donors entered the donor pool after the [12-month] deferral policy implementation. The failure to
identify a significant association between period of donation and incident infection . . . lends further
weight to the conclusion that there is no evidence that HIV incidence in first-time donors or firsttime male donors increased after implementation of the revised MSM eligibility criteria.”).
237. Joint Statement Before ACBSA on Donor Deferral for Men Who Have Had Sex with
Another Man (MSM) – 6/15/10, AM. ASS’N BLOOD BANKS (June 15, 2010),
http://www.aabb.org/advocacy/statements/Pages/statement061510.aspx [https://perma.cc/HEJ6PTEE] (noting that the data and publications available since a 2006 BPAC meeting have also
encouraged organizations to be critical of the BPAC and FDA because of their reluctance to change
the MSM for so long); see generally BPAC Meeting Summary – 03/20–03/21/19, AM. ASS’N
BLOOD BANKS, http://www.aabb.org/advocacy/government/bpac/Pages/bpacmeeting190320.aspx
[https://perma.cc/FR2Z-S5ET] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (showing most recent BPAC meeting
notes available).
238. See Joint Statement Before ACBSA, supra note 237 (explaining that the AABB, America’s
Blood Center, and American Red Cross were opposed to the Blood Ban had urged the FDA since
2006 to reevaluate the deferral criteria for male blood donors who have had sexual contact with
another male).
239. See Ashwin N. Skelly et al., Science over Stigma: The Need for Evidence-Based Blood
Donation Policies for Men Who Have Sex with Men in the USA, 7 LANCET HAEMATOLOGY 779,
781 (2020) (highlighting the need for the U.S. to follow the example of other countries); see also
McAdam & Parker, supra note 11, at 21 (explaining the different policy cases in various countries).
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questions regarding sexual orientation to establish a donor’s risk.240 In
Italy, for example, questions focus on the number of sexual partners that
a donor has had and whether the donor has used protection, such as a
condom. 241 Furthermore, a 2013 study published in Blood Transfus
found no significant increase after the MSM Ban’s eradication in the
proportion of HIV-antibody-positive blood donors who were men who
had sex with men compared to heterosexual donors.242 Additionally, in
spring 2020, the Supreme Court of Brazil struck down the country’s
MSM blood donor deferral and declared it unconstitutional.243 Brazil had
previously exercised a twelve-month deferral period for MSM blood
donations, but the highest court eliminated the waiting period altogether,
explaining that the deferral, based on discrimination and prejudice,
disproportionately restricted sexually active gay men from helping their
communities.244
The scientific evidence from peer countries such as Italy, which has
collected over two decades of data since eliminating the Ban, reveals that
existing controls and safeguards are effective in reducing the risk of HIVpositive blood from entering the blood supply and infecting blood
transfusion recipients.245 This revelation indicates that, like the policies
240. See McAdam & Parker, supra note 11, at 33 (“[T]he study considered Spain and Italy’s
risk-based approach, in which donors were considered for deferral based on behavior (having sex
with HIV carriers, having more than one sexual partner at a time, or having sex with an occasional
partner) over the previous twelve months.”).
241 . Barbara Suligoi et al., Changing Blood Donor Screening Criteria from Permanent
Deferral for Men Who Have Sex with Men to Individual Sexual Risk Assessment: No Evidence of a
Significant Impact on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic in Italy, 11 BLOOD TRANSFUS
441, 442 (2013); see also McAdam & Parker, supra note 11, at 40 (“In 2001, Italy removed the
question about male homosexual intercourse and replaced it with questions regarding risky sexual
behaviors such as having multiple partners and unprotected sex.”).
242. See Suligoi, supra note 241, at 446 (“[N]o significant increase in the proportion of MSM
compared to heterosexuals was observed among HIV antibody-positive blood donors, suggesting
that the change in donor deferral policy has not led to a disproportionate increase of HIVseropositive MSM.”).
243. Michael K. Lavers, Brazil Supreme Court Strikes Down MSM Blood Donor Ban, WASH.
BLADE (May 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonblade.com/2020/05/11/brazil-supreme-courtstrikes-down-msm-blood-donor-ban/ [https://perma.cc/96XZ-6HVH]; Fabio Teixeira, Brazil’s
Supreme Court Throws Out Rules That Limit Gay Men Donating Blood, REUTERS (May 10, 2020,
1:44
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-lgbt-blood-idUSKBN22M05N
[https://perma.cc/ZFV9-LUEE] (discussing Brazil’s Supreme Court decision to overturn law
limiting gay and bisexual men from donating blood).
244. See Teixeira, supra note 243 (“Instead of the state enabling [gay men] to promote good by
donating blood, it unduly restricts solidarity based on prejudice and discrimination.” (quoting
Brazil Supreme Court Minister Edson Fachin)).
245. See Beattie RH Sturrock & Stuart Mucklow, What Is the Evidence for the Change in the
Blood Donation Deferral Period for High-Risk Groups and Does It Go Far Enough?, 18 ROYAL
COLL. PHYSICIANS | CLINICAL MED. 304, 306 (2018) (“A comparison of the blood donor
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in question in both Romer v. Evans and Reed v. Reed, the Blood Ban
exists now as nothing but animus toward gay men because it, too, lacks a
rational relationship to legitimate state interests.246
Furthermore, when considering the totality of circumstances, the
policy seemingly exists as a bare desire to harm a disfavored group.247
Thus, as the Court decided in Romer v. Evans, this policy cannot be said
to further a legitimate government interest and thus would likely be found
to be unconstitutional under the rational basis review.248
V. PROPOSAL
The Blood Ban can be eliminated in a number of ways. It can be
revoked by the FDA, repealed through legislation in Congress, or struck
down in the courts. The FDA made the two modifications to the Ban
(decreasing it to a one-year deferral in 2015 and to a three-month deferral
in 2020). 249 Although President Trump stated that he did not directly
instruct the FDA to modify the Blood Ban from a one-year to a threemonth deferral, the reduction came after he ordered the FDA to eliminate
outdated rules and bureaucracy during the coronavirus pandemic.250 If
history is any indication, the dismantling of the policy will probably be
handled independently and unilaterally by the FDA, due to both public
pressure and pressure from outspoken lawmakers, like Senator Tammy

epidemiology between 1999 and 2009/10 showed no significant change in HIV prevalence in either
first time or repeat donors.”); see Alice Klein, New Rules for Gay and Bisexual Male Blood Donors
Found
to
Be
Safe,
NEW
SCIENTIST
(Nov.
29,
2019),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/2225154-new-rules-for-gay-and-bisexual-male-blooddonors-found-to-be-safe/#ixzz6pF2CZJvX [https://perma.cc/5WBC-R3WV] (“In Italy, for
example, the risk of getting HIV from a blood transfusion is estimated to be 1 in 13 million.”).
246. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (“[T]he amendment seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests.”).
247. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))).
248. Id. at 635–36.
249. See Heitz, supra note 5 (explaining how the FDA altered the ban in 2015 from a lifetime
ban to a twelve-month deferral); see also REVISED RECS., supra note 6, at 9 (outlining the
recommendations published by the FDA in 2020 to shorten the twelve-month deferral to a threemonth deferral for MSM).
250 . David Greene, Food and Drug Administration Seeks to Expand Treatment for
Coronavirus, NPR (Mar. 20, 2020, 9:09 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/20/818835878/foodand-drug-administration-seeks-to-expand-treatment-for-coronavirus
[https://perma.cc/PY2KKX9A] (statement of President Donald Trump) (“What the FDA is doing is incredible. They’ve
done things in times that were not even thinkable. And I’ve directed the FDA to eliminate outdated
rules and bureaucracy so this work can proceed rapidly, quickly and, I mean, fast.”).
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Baldwin, in Congress.251 Nevertheless, this Comment proposes that in
the wake of Bostock, a heightened scrutiny, resembling the modern
application of intermediate scrutiny for sex-based discrimination, should
be used.
A. The Potential Challenge to the Blood Ban in Courts
Bostock’s impact was limited to the definition of “sex” within the
confines of Title VII. 252 The majority deliberately emphasized the
limitation of its holding to the text of Title VII and its protections against
sex-based discrimination. 253 Nevertheless, if the courts extended
Bostock’s reasoning to include sexual orientation as inherent in sex, the
Blood Ban might be held unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment.254
Extending Bostock’s reasoning means the Blood Ban’s sexualorientation-based discrimination is analogous to sex- or gender-based
discrimination.255 This extension would then cement sexual orientation
as a quasi-suspect class that triggers the heightened scrutiny afforded to
sex-based discrimination—intermediate scrutiny. 256 A federal court in
Idaho has already extended Bostock’s definition of gender in other cases
involving discrimination.257 In Hecox v. Little, a federal judge applied
heightened scrutiny to assess an Idaho law that prohibited transgender

251. See Letter to Hahn, supra note 170 (urging FDA to reconsider and eliminate the Blood
Ban); see Padgett, supra note 170 (describing different lawmakers’ lobbying for changes to the
restriction in summer 2020).
252. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1742 (2020) (“Not because homosexuality or
transgender status are related to sex in some vague sense or because discrimination on these bases
has some disparate impact on one sex or another, but because to discriminate on these grounds
requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex.”).
253. Id. at 1753 (discussing the limitations of the decision in Bostock).
254. Id. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Under this logic, today’s decision may have effects that
extend well beyond the domain of federal antidiscrimination statutes. . . . Although the Court does
not want to think about the consequences of its decision, we will not be able to avoid those issues
for long.”); see also Gruberg, supra note 94 (“An extension of the Supreme Court’s finding in
Bostock that sex necessarily includes sexual orientation and gender identity could also mean, then,
that laws that target people based on sexual orientation or gender identity could be subject to
heightened scrutiny.”).
255. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“By equating discrimination because of
sexual orientation or gender identity with discrimination because of sex, the Court’s decision will
be cited as a ground for subjecting all three forms of discrimination to the same exacting standard
of review.”).
256 . Id. (highlighting Justice Alito’s hypothesis that Bostock opens the door to extend
intermediate scrutiny to sexual orientation cases).
257. See Gruberg, supra note 94 (“In his reasoning for applying heightened scrutiny to the Idaho
law, [a federal district court judge] cited the Supreme Court’s statement in Bostock affirming that
one cannot discriminate against an individual for being transgender without also discriminating
against that individual based on sex.”); see also Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 962, 974, 984
(D. Idaho 2020) (citing Bostock).
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women and girls from playing on sports teams and cited Bostock as the
relevant jurisprudence.258 If the ruling in Hecox is affirmed, intermediate
scrutiny will likely become the standard of review in any subsequent case
assessing the Blood Ban. Therefore, if that were the case, the impact that
applying intermediate scrutiny in assessing the Blood Ban would have on
the Constitution is negligible, as it would have already been established
in at least one prior case.
1. Beyond Rational Basis; Discrediting the Blood Ban Under
Heightened Scrutiny
Though the Supreme Court has not explicitly extended heightened
scrutiny to cases involving discrimination based on sexual orientation,
some judges point to Bostock as demonstrating a higher level of scrutiny
than mere rational basis.259 In Obergefell and Lawrence, the fundamental
rights at issue—marriage and privacy, respectively—triggered
heightened scrutiny.260 But Bostock represents a turning point because no
fundamental right was at issue, but the Court nevertheless applied a
seemingly higher level of scrutiny when including sexual orientation as a
part of sex.261 Sex discrimination sits between rational basis and strict
scrutiny review—a standard referred to as intermediate scrutiny.262 Strict
scrutiny demands the government prove a restriction is narrowly tailored
and serves a compelling government interest. 263 Intermediate scrutiny

258. Hecox, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 973–74 (citing Bostock as support for principle that “transgender
individuals qualify as a quasi-suspect class” (citing 140 S. Ct. at 1731)).
259. Hecox, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 974; Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting).
260. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (highlighting that the right to private intimacy
between consensual adults is fundamental); see Gruberg, supra note 94 (explaining that the focus
in Obergefell was based on the fundamental right of marriage).
261. See Gruberg, supra note 94 (“An extension of the Supreme Court’s finding in Bostock that
sex necessarily includes sexual orientation and gender identity could also mean, then, that laws that
target people based on sexual orientation or gender identity could be subject to heightened
scrutiny.”); see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (“[T]he party
seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the
burden of showing an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the classification.” (quoting
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981))).
262 . “[C]ourts will sometimes refer to intermediate scrutiny by other names, such as
‘heightened scrutiny,’ or as ‘rational basis with bite.’” Intermediate Scrutiny, supra note 40.
263 . See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2004) (“Under strict scrutiny, the
government has the burden of proving that racial classifications ‘are narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling governmental interests.’” (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (1995))); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (explaining
strict scrutiny as applied to racial classifications); see also Ozan O. Varol, Strict in Theory, but
Accommodating in Fact?, 75 MO. L. REV. 1243, 1245–46 (2010) (“As to its ends, the government
must show a compelling interest in drawing a suspect classification or infringing on a fundamental
right. As to its means, the government must prove that it adopted narrowly tailored means to achieve
that compelling interest.”).
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requires that the challenged law furthers an important government
interest and that the means of the law must be substantially related to the
interest. 264 Accordingly, applying Bostock’s holding that sex includes
sexual orientation, the Court would analyze the Blood Ban’s validity
according to intermediate scrutiny. Though it is worth reiterating that the
Court in Bostock defined sex as inclusive of sexual orientation only
within the parameters of Title VII, this definition could be extended to
include sexual orientation as part of gender in an equal-protection
analysis.265 As Justice Alito noted in his dissent:
Finally, despite the important differences between the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VII, the Court’s decision may exert a
gravitational pull in constitutional cases. Under our precedents, the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits sex-based discrimination unless a
“heightened” standard of review is met. By equating discrimination
because of sexual orientation or gender identity with discrimination
because of sex, the Court’s decision will be cited as a ground for
subjecting all three forms of discrimination to the same exacting
standard of review.266

Thus, if what Justice Alito cautions proves true, the Blood Ban would
be assessed under an intermediate scrutiny analysis.267
As such, intermediate scrutiny first asks whether the Blood Ban
furthers an important government interest.268 In Craig v. Boren, the Court
stated that the protection of public health and safety is an important
function of the government.269 Similarly, the Court could logically find
limiting the spread of the AIDS virus is an important government

264. See Intermediate Scrutiny, supra note 40 (explaining intermediate scrutiny); see also Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (affirming that state law discriminating based on sex must serve
“important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives” (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971))); see also Wexler, supra note 41, at 56
(“The cat was out of the bag: a new equal protection standard had been born. The intermediate, or
middle-tier, test was a compromise . . . .”).
265. See Gruberg, supra note 94 (“An extension of the Supreme Court’s finding in Bostock that
sex necessarily includes sexual orientation and gender identity could also mean, then, that laws that
target people based on sexual orientation or gender identity could be subject to heightened
scrutiny.”); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1783 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the Bostock majority’s definition of gender to include sexual orientation under Title
VII could be extended to equal-protection analyses and heightened scrutiny).
266. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137
S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017)).
267. Id.
268. See Intermediate Scrutiny, supra note 40 (explaining intermediate scrutiny); see also
Boren, 429 U.S. at 197 (affirming that state law discriminating based on sex must serve “important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”
(citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971))).
269. Boren, 429 U.S. at 199–200.
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objective. 270 But in light of Boren and prior rational-relationship
justifications based on safety, it is unlikely that data would support a
court’s conclusion that sexual orientation-based discrimination is
substantially related to achieving that objective.271 The analysis of the
relationship would rely on the science-based arguments, likely rendering
the Ban unconstitutional under rational basis review, but a higher level of
scrutiny could examine the validity of the policy even more closely.272
The FDA justifies the Ban with the high statistical prevalence of
HIV/AIDS among men who have sex with men.273 Thus, using Bostock’s
inclusion of sexual orientation within sex, and extending it from Title VII
to an equal-protection analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
statistical evidence must be substantially related to the objective.274 The
Court has repeatedly found that the use of statistics to justify burdening
individuals of a certain gender insufficient to uphold discriminatory
policies.275
For instance, in Craig v. Boren, the Court found that even though
270. See Niezgoda, supra note 212, at 99 (discussing government’s history of intervening to
protect public health, especially regarding secondhand tobacco smoke).
271. See Boren, 429 U.S. at 200–04 (finding statistics that young men were more likely to be
involved in a DUI-related crash than young women were insufficient to prohibit young men—but
allow young women—to consume certain alcoholic drinks); City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709–10 (1978) (finding that using statistical evidence that
women live longer than men was insufficient to require female employees to pay more into pension
funds than male employees).
272. See Brian Soucek, The Case of the Religious Gay Blood Donor, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1893, 1904 (2019) (noting some circuits apply heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation
discrimination in equal-protection claims); see SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740
F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding heightened scrutiny applies to sexual orientation
discrimination claims in the Ninth Circuit, prior to both the Obergefell (2015) and Bostock (2020)
decisions).
273. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV AND GAY AND BISEXUAL MEN 1
(2020), https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/group/msm/cdc-hiv-msm.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR4WCLEE] (noting that 69 percent of new HIV diagnoses in the United States and dependent areas were
among gay men in 2018); see also Dwayne J. Bensing, Comment, Science or Stigma: Potential
Challenges to the FDA’s Ban on Gay Blood, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 485, 500 (2011) (“The FDA
defends the policy by stating the high HIV prevalence . . . in MSM men.”); see Mike Darling,
Banned for Life: Why Gay Men Still Can’t Donate Blood, NBC NEWS (July 14, 2013, 9:42 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/healthmain/banned-life-why-gay-men-still-cant-donate-blood6c10622947 [https://perma.cc/3WKM-B7JR] (“The FDA classifies all gay men in the highest-risk
blood-donor category—the same category as IV drug users and people who’ve spent more than
five years since 1980 in a country that has mad cow disease.”).
274. Definitions or explanations under one statute can sometimes influence interpretation of
other areas of law outside of the original statute. See Emeldi v. Univ. of Oreg., 698 F.3d 715, 724
(9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that stating a sex-based retaliation claim under Title IX is analogous to
the same claim under Title VII); see also Boren, 429 U.S. at 204 (discussing that the requirement
for gender-based policies must be “substantially related to the achievement of the statutory
objective”).
275. See Boren, 429 U.S. at 200–05; Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709 (explaining illegitimacy of using
statistics to broadly discriminate against groups).
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young men were more likely to be involved in drunk-driving traffic
accidents than similarly aged women, Oklahoma could not prohibit these
men from purchasing alcoholic beverages while allowing similarly aged
women to purchase the same beverage. 276 The Court reasoned that
although the statistics used by Oklahoma inarguably showed men (ages
eighteen to twenty) were more likely to be arrested for alcohol-related
driving offenses than women of the same age, this statistical probability
alone could not justify sex-based discrimination.277 The Court in Boren
explained that the use of sex-based statistics to prove extensive
sociological schemes was unequivocally opposed to the Equal Protection
Clause’s foundational principles.278 In other words, the Court has found
using statistics as the sole basis for discriminatory policies in direct
tension with constitutional equal protection guarantees. 279 The FDA’s
use of HIV/AIDS statistics to defend the Blood Ban as the sole
justification is analogous to Oklahoma’s explanation in Boren.280
As noted in the rational basis discussion, the advanced and highly
accurate testing of all donated blood to detect HIV would likely defeat
any argument that the Blood Ban is still rational; however, under
heightened scrutiny, an examination of the ineffectiveness of the current
policy’s implementation is germane as well.281
As it stands, the Blood Ban policy requires donors to answer screening
questions.282 Whomever is administering the blood donation must ask
any male blood donor if he has had sexual contact with a male within the
past three months.283 There are three issues that most affect the rationality
of this question, beyond its discriminatory nature and overall lack of

276. Boren, 429 U.S. at 204 (finding the Oklahoma statute unconstitutional and a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see Wexler, supra note 41, at 51–52
(explaining the holding of Boren).
277. Boren, 429 U.S. at 201 (explaining the statistics were not trivial but could not be employed
for a sex-based policy).
278. “[P]roving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that
inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause.”
Id. at 204.
279. The Court explained that the use of statistics to define an entire class, and thus, restrict its
liberty is exactly what the Equal Protection Clause exists to protect against. Id.
280. See id. at 201 (“Even were this statistical evidence accepted as accurate, it nevertheless
offers only a weak answer to the equal protection question presented here.”); see Bensing, supra
note 273, at 500 (“The FDA defends the policy by stating the high HIV prevalence . . . in MSM
men.”).
281. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1328 (2007)
(explaining that under higher scrutiny, statute’s effectiveness must also be considered if it
discriminates and an equally effective, but less discriminatory means could achieve the same goal).
282. See Full Length Donor History Questionnaire (DHQ), supra note 225 (listing all the
questions asked of prospective blood donors); REVISED RECS., supra note 6, at 7 (noting DHQ).
283. See id. (asking the donor specifically if he has “[h]ad sexual contact with another male”).
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scientific support: 1) its redundancy,284 2) its over-inclusiveness,285 and
3) its inefficacy.286
a. Redundancy of the Question’s Goal
First and foremost, the question does not need to be asked because it
is redundant in its goal.287 The goal of this question, as the expression of
the Blood Ban policy, is to prevent the spread of AIDS through the
exclusion of high-risk individuals from donating blood and, thus,
infecting the blood supply with HIV.288 But among the other screening
questions, the administrator must ask if the potential donor has had sexual
contact with anyone who has HIV/AIDS or has tested positive for
HIV/AIDS in the past three months. 289 Though the two questions are
clearly different, the purpose is the same—identifying donors who should
be ineligible to donate blood.290 Though a gay man who has had sex with
another man may have been unknowingly exposed to HIV, the same can
be said of a heterosexual donor. 291 Therefore, the MSM question is
redundant in its purpose and falls short of effectively contributing to the
overall goal of mitigating the spread of HIV/AIDS.
b. Distinguishing “Gay Men” as a Class
Secondly, the question is not one about risky activity but instead about
status and thus aimed at excluding an entire class of people.292 Donors
answer other questions like whether they have had sex with a prostitute,
had a tattoo, had a body piercing, or had an organ transplant—all within

284. See discussion supra Section V.A.1.a.
285. See discussion supra Section V.A.1.b.
286. See discussion supra Section V.A.1.c.
287. See REVISED RECS., supra note 6, at 2–7 (outlining the purpose and the current status of
the FDA MSM policy); see Fallon, supra note 281, at 1328 (explaining that under heightened
scrutiny, alternative options that are equally effective and less discriminatory must be considered).
288. See REVISED RECS., supra note 6, at 7 (“The following sections summarize the revised
recommendations related to blood donor deferral and requalification related to reducing the risk of
HIV transmission by blood and blood products.”).
289. See Full Length Donor History Questionnaire (DHQ), supra note 225 (listing questions
asked of prospective blood donors, including whether the donor has “[h]ad sexual contact with
anyone who has HIV/AIDS or has had a positive test for the HIV/AIDS virus?”).
290. See REVISED RECS., supra note 6, at 7 (“The following sections summarize the revised
recommendations related to blood donor deferral and requalification related to reducing the risk of
HIV transmission by blood and blood products.”).
291. See McAdam & Parker, supra note 11, at 59 (explaining Blood Ban’s overinclusivity by
admitting risky heterosexual donors).
292 . See id. at 59 (“By categorically excluding gay men, the MSM policy is facially
discriminatory. The ban does not apply to other high-risk groups, thus is not rationally related to
its stated goal of protecting the nation’s blood supply. A ban that discriminates against a suspect
class without commendable rationalization violates the Equal Protection Clause and should be
deemed unconstitutional.”).
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in the past three months.293 The MSM question is distinct from the others
because of its permanence.294 All the other questions in this section of
the screening address temporary activities that can reasonably be ceased,
allowing the donor to become eligible after a certain period at any point
in the potential donor’s life. However, the MSM question singles out a
class of people—gay men—and excludes them simply based on that
status.295 It is unreasonable to assume that a gay individual would abstain
from sex for a period of time in the same way that an individual may
abstain from getting a body piercing, receiving an organ transplant, or
having sex with a prostitute for the same amount of time, thus permitting
them to donate blood. Furthermore, the question does not consider the
risk level of the gay man’s sexual conduct and, instead, treats all gay sex
as inherently risky. In other words, the question (and the policy) treats a
gay man who has been tested for HIV and is in a monogamous, long-term
relationship the same as it would treat a gay man who has unprotected
sex with many sexual partners and who has not been tested for HIV.296
Even more significantly, the policy is hypocritical in that it treats the
aforementioned gay man (HIV-negative and in a long-term, monogamous
relationship) as a riskier donor than a heterosexual donor who engages in
unprotected sex with many sexual partners and who also has not been
tested for HIV.297 Additionally, this MSM question remains unique on
the blood donation screening for singling out a certain class of people.298
There are no other questions that differentiate between groups based on
race, sex, sexual orientation, sexual identity, nationality, or ethnicity who
are disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS. 299 Statistics show that
certain racial and ethnic communities have a higher prevalence of
293. See Full Length Donor History Questionnaire (DHQ), supra note 225 (listing all questions
asked of prospective blood donors); see generally REVISED RECS., supra note 6.
294. The Court has recognized the liberty of consensual sexual intimacy as integral to the
fundamental rights of privacy and in relationships with other people. It is clear that the right to
engage in consensual sexual activities has been found to be more integral and important to humans’
fundamental rights and life than the ability to get a tattoo or piercing. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the
person in making these choices, we stated as follows: ‘These matters, involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992))).
295. See McAdam & Parker, supra note 11, at 58 (“The MSM ban targets all gay men, even
those who practice safe sex, get tested regularly, and do not have an HIV infection.”).
296. Id. (“[A] person does not get HIV/AIDS because he is gay, nor does a person only get HIV
by having sex with a man. A person contracts HIV by participating in risky behavior. It does not
matter if that person is gay or straight.”).
297. Id. at 58–59.
298. See Full Length Donor History Questionnaire (DHQ), supra note 225 (listing all questions
asked of prospective blood donors).
299. Id.
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HIV/AIDS when compared to the national average in the United
States.300 Though certain racial groups make up a disproportionate share
of those infected with HIV/AIDS, the screening questions only
differentiate between gay men and everyone else.301 Overall, the question
does not truly consider the riskiness of the sexual behaviors or conduct
beyond donors’ sexual orientation, thus revealing an overtly homophobic
policy.
c. The Insubstantiality of the Question’s Efficacy
Lastly, and perhaps most obviously, the screening question is irrational
because its efficacy is uncertain. 302 The screening question assumes
potential donors to be truthful with neither incentive nor threat of
punishment.303 Donating blood is an uncompensated act of good faith, so
there is no incentive for donors to lie or to tell the truth, nor the ability for
the blood bank or FDA to punish those who are not truthful in their
screening questions. 304 Blood drives often take place at high schools,
universities, and churches as a way for schools and organizations to help
their communities. 305 Therefore, a gay man may feel uncomfortable

300. See HIV and AIDS in the United States of America (USA), AVERT (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/western-central-europe-north-america/usa
[https://perma.cc/N2ZQ-C4RF] (“Stigma and discrimination continue to hamper people’s access to
HIV prevention as well as testing and treatment services, which fuels a cycle of new infections.”);
see also id. (“The HIV epidemic in the USA has impacted some groups more than others. These
groups . . . can be grouped by transmission category (for example, men who have sex with men)
but also by race and ethnicity, with people of colour having significantly higher rates of HIV
infection over white Americans.”).
301. See Full Length Donor History Questionnaire (DHQ), supra note 225 (listing all questions
asked of prospective blood donors).
302. A British study found that over 10 percent of men surveyed in a United Kingdom who had
sex with other men had been noncompliant with the Ban. The study highlights that the reasons men
violated the Ban and still donated blood while ineligible included the self-categorization of oneself
as low risk, or discounting sexual experience that barred donation. Other reasons included the belief
that screening safeguarded blood, a misunderstanding of the rule, the need for secrecy around
sexual history, and rarely, resentment over inequity of the deferral. P. Grenfell et al., Views and
Experiences of Men Who Have Sex with Men on the Ban on Blood Donation: A Cross Sectional
Survey with Qualitative Interviews, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Sept. 8,
2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3168936/; see Pulver, supra note 6, at 119
(explaining that people lie to donate blood or to avoid explaining to others why they cannot donate
blood).
303. John Riley, Blood Lies: Gay Men Who Lie to Donate Blood, METRO WEEKLY (July 13,
2016),
https://www.metroweekly.com/2016/07/blood-lies-gay-men-lie-donate-blood/
[https://perma.cc/T9ZL-HWN2] (explaining the commonplace practice of gay, sexually-active
men lying to donate blood for a variety of reasons).
304. Id.; see Shaw, supra note 6 (highlighting testimony that blood bank nurses do not know if
blood donor is gay or is being honest).
305. Alexander Indrikovs, The Pandemic Is Pushing Blood Supplies to the Brink, U.S. NEWS &
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answering this question truthfully if he fears that he is within earshot of
his classmates, colleagues, or fellow parishioners. 306 Because stigma
around homosexuality still exists, coupled with the typical location of
blood drives and the lack of any authority by the blood banks,
respondents may not answer truthfully. 307 As in Craig v. Boren, a
policy’s enforcement is also worth questioning.308 In Boren, the Court
noted that the challenged law did nothing to prevent a younger man from
consuming the beverage he could not legally purchase as long as a female
companion or an older male bought it for him.309 The Blood Ban is a
similar policy, in that its enforcement and posited effectiveness depend
entirely upon the truthfulness of the donor; one gives blood on the honor
system, so to speak. 310 Thus, the relationship between preventing the
spread of AIDS and disclosing sexual orientation becomes increasingly
tenuous under scrutiny, just as in Boren, the relationship between public
safety and treating men and women differently was insufficiently close.
Though the ineffectiveness and problematic nature of the MSM
question may not independently demonstrate that the Blood Ban policy
is irrational, when considered with the overall discriminatory nature of
the policy, as well as medical innovations in testing donated blood, the
policy is not substantially related to the goal of mitigating the spread of
HIV/AIDS.
B. Health & Societal Impacts
One of the greatest quantifiable impacts that the abolition of the Blood
Ban will have is to increase the available blood supply. The Williams
Institute on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Law at the University
WORLD REPORT (Nov. 11, 2020, 11:08 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiestcommunities/articles/2020-11-11/covid-19-is-pushing-us-blood-supplies-to-the-brink
[https://perma.cc/7N87-6BYE] (touching on the fact that blood supply dwindled as pandemic
caused cancellations of blood drives at closed schools and churches).
306. See Riley, supra note 303 (highlighting why some Americans choose to donate blood
despite being ineligible under the Blood Ban); see Grenfell, supra note 302 (listing the reasons why
men had violated the Blood Ban in the United Kingdom and still donated blood, despite being
prohibited from doing so).
307. See Riley, supra note 303 (explaining how stereotypes impact blood drive respondents).
308. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (highlighting the difficulty at enforcing the
restriction to have any impact to the desire goals of the statute).
309. Id. (“In fact, when it is further recognized that Oklahoma’s statute prohibits only the selling
of 3.2% beer to young males and not their drinking the beverage once acquired (even after purchase
by their 18–20-year-old female companions), the relationship between gender and traffic safety
becomes far too tenuous to satisfy Reed’s requirement that the gender-based difference be
substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective.”).
310. See Riley, supra note 303 (highlighting why some Americans choose to donate blood
despite being ineligible under the Blood Ban); see Grenfell, supra note 302 (listing the reasons why
men had violated the Blood Ban in the United Kingdom and still donated blood, despite being
prohibited from doing so).
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of California Los Angeles estimated that if the ban were lifted, more than
600,000 additional pints of blood would be donated, resulting in aid to
more than one million individuals.311 This impact, especially during the
blood shortage caused by the COVID-19 crisis, would be palpable.
The second greatest impact is that dismantling the Blood Ban would
help decrease the stigma of being gay. Researchers have found that when
there is less of a stigma around homosexuality and HIV, more people are
likely to get tested for HIV.312 Interestingly, an elimination of the policy
may actually lead to a healthier populace because of the increase in
donated blood as well as an increase in people knowing their HIV status
and being able to take proactive measures to reduce its transmission and
seek treatment. Ultimately, this policy is homophobic and has negatively
impacted the morale and feelings of inclusion of individuals in the gay
community. To want to help others by giving the gift of life, only to be
denied based on your sexual orientation, is stigmatizing. The eradication
of the policy would undoubtedly advance equality.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the ruling in Romer v. Evans, nearly forty years ago, the Court
has continued to dismantle discriminatory laws and policies that have
burdened homosexuals. Although it began with more basic protections
and rights, such as prohibiting government discrimination against gays,
barring the criminalization of consensual sex between gay adults, and the
right to marry, the Court has since progressed to extending equal
protection and fundamental rights in more nuanced rulings. The successes
that the gay-rights movement has celebrated since the days of Romer and
the original five young gay men mysteriously dying in Los Angeles
cannot be understated. Nevertheless, the focus should now shift to
eradicating the still-lingering archaic Gay Blood Ban.
This Comment argues the Gay Blood Ban has become untenable under
either a rational basis or a heightened scrutiny standard of review. If
rational basis is applied, the Blood Ban will fall short because of the
progress made in science and technology—notably the advanced
screening of donated blood to detect HIV and the growing adoption of
PrEP to prevent the spread of HIV among gay men through sexual
contact. More so, this Comment contends that under a higher standard of
review—such as intermediate scrutiny—, the Blood Ban will also fail.

311. See Schnell & Morrison, supra note 145 (discussing lawmakers’ advocacy for Blood Ban’s
repeal based on urgent need for blood donations during the coronavirus pandemic).
312. See HIV and AIDS in the United States of America (USA), supra note 300 (explaining that
HIV-related stigma, socially conservative communities, and low HIV-risk perception all serve as
barriers to testing).
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Using language from Bostock, if sexual orientation is to be defined as
inextricably linked to “sex,” this would trigger heightened scrutiny
analysis of the Blood Ban, and the discriminatory principles woven into
the policy will be exposed and held unconstitutional.
It is time for the Blood Ban to be challenged or repealed as we continue
to progress to a more equitable and fair society.

